























Abstract of the Thesis Entitled 
Making Sense by Make-Believing: A Defence of Semantic Fictionalism 
Many philosophers believe that the folk talk of meaning (e.g. “ 'Bachelor' means 
unmarried man”) states facts about meaning, or semantic facts. Most of them 
further believe that these facts are grounded in the physical reality. I argue 
against both views: (1) there are no semantic facts, insofar as they must be phys-
ically grounded; (2) meaning-talk does not state semantic facts, is not commit-
ted to them, and should instead be understood as a kind of make-believe. Chap-
ter 1 presents an argument for (1), first expounded (I think) by Kripke and here 
modified for my purpose. The argument is that any physical system with any 
representational capacity at all can be regarded as having a unique, determi-
nate function; thus if representation—hence meaning—is physically grounded, 
so must be the function; but no such function can be physically grounded. 
Chapter 2 argues, first, that meaning-talk does not commit us to semantic facts 
because we are indifferent to their existence. Second, that make-believe utter-
ances (e.g. “Crotone is on the arch of the Italian boot”) more than any other 
discourse provide a good model for meaning-talk. Construing meaning-talk 
as make-believe is plausible and illuminating. I conclude that, while natural-






理解爲一種虛構。第一章論證第一點（基于K r i p k e的論證，但据本文目的作了適 
當裁剪 ) :任何具備表徵能力的物理系统皆等價於擁有某一獨特、確定功能的機 
器；若語義事實有物理基礎，則功能事實也當有物理基礎，但功能事實並無物理 
基礎。第二章首先論證日常語義話語不要求語義事實存在（因我們對其存在與 
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We talk as though there is sense to be made of what we say. Is there, really? I
say: no, not really. There is no fact of the matter about what anyone means by
any expression or what any expression whatsoever means. Put simply, there is
no semantic fact. This is the first thesis I want to defend, the thesis of semantic
anti-realism.
Are we mistaken, then, to think (and say) that “bachelor” means unmarried
man, that “bank” is ambiguous, that “Das Nichts nichtet” is sheer nonsense?
I say: we may still be right. Meaning-talk—by this I mean what the man in the
street says about meanings and related matters, not philosophical or scientific
theories of meaning or signalling—can be true even though it isn’t true of any
fact. Meaning-talk can be, and often is, true in games of make-believe. This is the
second thesis I want to defend, the thesis that I call semantic fictionalism.
the first thesis: semantic anti-realism
This says there are no semantic facts, but what is a fact? Ordinary English is
a little misleading here, by allowing (at least) two uses of “fact.” Phrases such
as “in fact” and “the fact that” can normally be prefixed to assertions without
adding, and be deleted without subtracting, any substance. “It is a fact that
 Some use different quotation marks for quoting and mentioning. I will not do this. One can
get quite worked up trying to do this consistently, and the extra clarity to be gained seems to
me to be zero (in the present work at least). So I will always use double quotes and, inside
double quotes, single quotes. Thus: I apologise for the  occurrences of “bachelor” (including
this one) in this thesis.

p” may be used to assert no more, and no less, than “p,” though with perhaps
a little more emphasis. This is the cheap, non-committing sense of “fact.” To
deny, in this sense, that it is a fact that some expressions are meaningful is to
claim that it is a fact that no expression is meaningful, which is just to claim
that no expression is meaningful, and this can’t be true whether or not it is
itself meaningful.
But this is not what my first thesis claims. My first thesis does not deny
that, say, “bachelor” means unmarried man. It does not deny that “bachelor”
in fact means that, or that it is a fact that it means that. It denies something
entirely different—namely the existence of the fact about “bachelor”s meaning
unmarried man. It denies that there are real features of the world in virtue of
which “bachelor” means unmarried man. Here “fact” is used in an ontologi-
cally committing sense. To assert a fact in this sense is to add an item to one’s
ontology, and to deny is to delete. “There is a fact about p” asserts more than
just “p.”
By way of self-legislation, I’ll flag the two uses as follows:
The ontologically non-committing use: in fact p; the fact that p;
The ontologically committing use: the fact about p.
To get more intuitive grip on the latter, one may think of “facts about p”
as a shorthand for “real features of the world that ground p.” Grounding (Fine
; Schaffer ) is what happens in all the following cases and many be-
sides: some bricks’ being laid where they are grounds the wall’s standing where
it is. Neil Armstrong’s landing on the moon grounds men’s having landed on
the moon. Cicero’s being self-identical grounds his being Tully. C-fibre’s firing
in my left thumb grounds my feeling pain in my left thumb. And some facts—
if only we knew what they are—ground the economy’s being in recession. But
seals’ being cute is not grounded (only) in facts about seals, cuteness being in
the eyes of the beholder. These are uncontroversial examples. More controver-
sially, ethical naturalists maintain, and G. E. Moore famously denies, that the

naturalistic properties of a good thing ground the thing’s goodness. And A-
theorists maintain, while B-theorists deny, that some real features of the world
ground the flow of time. The specific relations are not the same in each case:
it may be constitution, or implication, or identity, or some sort of determina-
tion (though always stronger than mere supervenience). But one gets the sense
that they all have something important in common. That is what “grounding”
wants to capture.
My first thesis, then, can be stated in terms of grounding. It claims that
a symbol’s (or state’s) meaning or representing what it does is not grounded
in reality. To claim this one need not deny—even as a matter of fact, in the
non-committing sense—that “bachelor” means unmarried man, any more than
a moral anti-realist need deny that murder is in fact, or as a matter of fact,
wrong.
What is that reality in which things are grounded? The most widely ac-
cepted answers are also the most elusive, such as “what is out there,” or “what
exists independent of human representation.” I propose to forsake a little bit of
common ground for a lot more specificity. Reality, I say, includes (a) whatever is
described by the best physics; (b) whatever is grounded in (a); and (c) whatever
is grounded in (b), or partly in (a) and partly in (b). These are all the reality.
Physical facts and facts so recursively grounded therein are all the facts (in the
committing sense). I also assume that semantic or intentional facts, if any there
be, would not fall in (a). If there are any such facts, they have to be physically
grounded. So the first thesis stated in full is that semantic facts need be physically
grounded in order to exist, they are not physically grounded, and therefore they do
not exist.
 Historically these disputes were not always (or perhaps ever) presented in terms of grounding,
but this, it seems to me, is just the sociological fact that the word “grounding” was not then
in vogue.
 I do not know how to argue for this, except by saying that modern physics is so successful that
I find it hard to believe it is radically complete. But if you are more impressed by cognitive
limitations of slugs and, like Jackson () and McGinn (), suspect that we may be
similarly limited, well, you might be right, for all I know. I would be content, however, to
figure out the best bet for myself and like-minded friends. For another excuse, see n.  below.

Few hold this thesis—none I know of. Kripke’s () is perhaps the first,
and perhaps the only, argument for semantic anti-realism. But Kripke does
not himself endorse anti-realism. He seems to want to attribute it to Wittgen-
stein (), and yet it is generally agreed that Wittgenstein does not endorse
it either.
A pluralist minority hold that semantic facts are grounded but not quite in
the physical, recursive way. Wittgensteinians (Baker and Hacker ; McGinn
) appeal to capacity, which they take (wrongly, I think) to be explanato-
rily primitive. Wright () seeks to ground semantic facts in speakers’ judg-
ment. But as Boghossian () points out, this seems a non-starter. Judging
is an intentional state, but being intentional it awaits further grounding, and
so all Wright achieves is sweeping the problem under a nearby carpet. Mc-
Dowell (), taking a communitarian approach, claims that semantic facts
are grounded in customs of a linguistic community and are somehow directly
accessible to members of that community. Yet how a community can give us
something a mere aggregate of its members cannot, when the two seem phys-
ically equivalent, he does not quite say. The same objection applies to Bloor’s
() constructivist account. McGinn (), after converting to transcen-
dental naturalism, is agnostic. He accepts that semantic facts are physical but
suspects that we may be cognitively handicapped ever to know how they are
grounded, or whether they are rather a fundamental component of physical re-
ality that needs no grounding. So he leaves open that physics in its present,
 More accurately, Wittgenstein’s argument as it struck Kripke (Kripke : ix). But I’ll sim-
plify call it Kripke’s.
 Baker and Hacker (); McDowell (); McGinn (); Wright (). Byrne () and
Wilson (, ) see more affinity between Kripke’s Wittgenstein and the actual Wittgen-
stein, but they do not dispute the general verdict.
 Otherwise Wright’s view would probably collapse into some version of dispositionalism,
which he rejects.
 The sceptical solution Kripke presents (without endorsement) in his  book is also some-
times taken to be a constructivist account: see Hattiangadi () for a recent example. This
arguably gets Kripke wrong (Byrne ; Davies ). If semantic facts are constructed, they
exist after all. But the sceptical solution concedes that there are no semantic facts. It tries to
make sense of meaning-talk in the absence of them. It is supposed to do the same kind of job
as my second thesis, not a rebuttal of the first.

mature form may still be radically incomplete. Suffice it to say McGinn is quite
alone in this.
The majority view remains that semantic facts are grounded in some famil-
iar physical facts, such as dispositions, in the recursive way. Such a view in
various forms has been defended for meaning in public language (Blackburn
b; Horwich , ; Martin and Heil ). But it is of more interest
when tailored to mental representation. Minds are more fundamental: it is hu-
man minds that endow the otherwise meaningless sounds and ink drops with
meaning. This is good reason to expect a theory of public meaning to follow
from a theory of mental content. There is also good reason to expect that any
dispositional theory of public meaning must be a theory of mental content in
the first instance. For verbal behaviour is mediated by background beliefs and
desires, which are mental states having content. A person with a suitable set
of beliefs and desires can be disposed or caused to say just anything in any cir-
cumstance. (A lot of comedies are based on this.) If a dispositional theory of
public meaning is to succeed, it must first account for the content of beliefs and
desires.
So it is for good reason that the major figures working on naturalising se-
mantics, whom I shall call the naturalisers, have their gaze squarely fixed on
mental content. But their agreement goes deeper. Inspired by Shannon’s math-
ematical theory of communication, Dretske () proposes that the content
of a mental state is the information the state is supposed to carry. This is a
powerful idea, and justly influential. As we shall see (Section . et seq.), the
major naturalising proposals in the market all follow this line. They differ only
(though of course importantly) in the way they try to make physical sense of
this supposedness.
If the first thesis is true, however, neither meaning nor content can be nat-
uralised because they are not even there—not really there. Below I will focus
 This is another reason why I am not apologetic about presupposing physicalism.
 As Boghossian () and Fodor (), among many others, have argued.

almost exclusively on mental representation though, and only make occasional
reference to the linguistic. I do so because, first, minds are fundamental. And
second, because several proposals to naturalise mental content have been ex-
tremely popular; whereas a project to (directly) naturalise linguistic meaning
does not even exist. Many philosophers working in a Gricean tradition try to
understand linguistic meanings in terms of intention. But this take us back to
mind.
the second thesis: semantic fictionalism
This says that meaning-talk is a sort of fiction, or better, make-believe. (I won’t
explain this until Chapter .)
Something like this second thesis (if not exactly this one) is necessitated by
the first. If semantic facts exist, we can say true things about them. But if,
as the first thesis claims, they do not exist, then anything we say about them
will be at least not true—perhaps just false. But some instances of meaning-
talk are patently true: it is true, for instance, that “bachelor” means unmarried
man. Any argument to the contrary has (as Schaffer  likes to say) met its
reductio.
So the first thesis would meet its reductio if meaning-talk is about seman-
tic facts. Kripke () sees the threat, and he fends it off by proposing that
meaning-talk just isn’t in the business of stating semantic facts, “fact” in the
committing sense. I think this is on the right track. But the track forks as one
tries to find some other business for meaning-talk. One way is to go expres-
sivist and claim that, appearance notwithstanding, meaning-talk is not even
descriptive, but expresses sentiments like approval or allegiance. According to
the expressivist, perhaps “By ‘bachelor’ John means unmarried man” is used
to approve John’s use of “bachelor,” and “ ‘Bachelor’ means unmarried man” is
 Or so I read him. Soames () cites evidence for another reading on which Kripke’s sug-
gestion is that meaning-talk is not fact-stating even in the non-committing sense. Soames
concludes that this suggestion is incoherent, and I agree.

used to declare one’s own allegiance to the way fellow speakers use “bachelor.”
(This seems like what Kripke has in mind, but this part of his book is not as
fully developed as one would like it to be.) But disregarding the descriptive
feature is a huge cost. A more conservative alternative is to take the descrip-
tive feature at face value but deny the usual ontological commitment associated
therewith. Fictionalism does just this. The idea is to model meaning-talk on
utterances like “Sherlock Holmes is a brilliant detective,” which is descriptive,
can be true or false, and does not commit the speaker to the existence of or facts
about Holmes.
Saving the first thesis from absurdity is not the only motivation for semantic
fictionalism. Whether semantic facts exist or not, there is reason to believe that
our meaning-talk just does not commit us to them. Semantic fictionalism is
true, I claim, even if semantic anti-realism turns out false—just as fictionalism
about Santa Claus-talk would still be true even if it turns out that something
like Santa does exist.
Quine deplores the fictionalist move. “I deplore,” he says, “such philosoph-
ical double talk which would repudiate an ontology while simultaneously en-
joying its benefit” (: ). His injunction holds less sway today than it used
to. Double talk thrives in quite a few corners (though still, to Quine’s comfort,
not prevalent). Van Fraassen () was one early source of inspiration; Field’s
() nominalist interpretation of mathematics was another. Lewis also de-
served credit, though I’m not sure if he would be much delighted. His ()
account of truth in fiction has been deployed to argue for fictionalism—against
 Under two heads: first, and this is the smaller cost, disregarding the descriptive feature is
just not plausible; second, there is the Frege-Geach problem, or the problem of explaining
logical inference in allegedly expressive talk. Recent work by Schroeder () confirms the
long-standing suspicion that this problem has no easy solution. If solvable at all, it has to be
solved with extremely strong assumptions about the working of natural language.
 More accurately, hermeneutic fictionalism does just this; this is a claim about how a discourse
works and has always worked—namely, that it is and has always been a fiction, never com-
mitted in some relevant respect. Revolutionary fictionalism is the claim that we ought to adopt
a fictionalist attitude toward a discourse which we did not adopt before, going on talking the
old way but with fingers crossed. (These coinages are by Burgess and Rosen .)
 Field is the odd one in the group. He thinks that mathematic discourse is literally false. Latter-
day fictionalists, such as Yablo (, ) and Eklund (), have come to reject this.

his own realism—about possible worlds (Rosen ). Then in the s, a ma-
jor development came with Walton’s (, ) work on make-believe, orig-
inally written as aesthetics. Make-believe provides fictionalists a more flexible
and often more plausible model than the Lewisian truth in fiction, on which
much recent work on fictionalism is based (as is the present thesis). Among
them, Crimmins () advocates fictionalism about identity statements; Yablo
(, , ) fictionalism about mathematics; Walton () fictional-
ism about negative existential statements; and Woodbridge () fictionalism
about truth.
As it gains popularity, fictionalism also earns able critics (Richard ;
Stanley ). Later (Section ..) I shall go some way toward answering some
of the objections.
On the whole, however, it seems as if this good news has not excited the
town of meaning. (As with the first thesis, I am also the only one I know of
to hold the second.) Why not? Maybe the townspeople feel too safe about their
possession of semantic facts. Maybe they have heard the news but remained
unimpressed. One may speculate. Be that as it may, I want to show that we
are not in safe possession of semantic facts, and the fictionalist news should
impress.
I shall proceed as Quine advised, repudiating an ontology (Chapter ) while
enjoying its benefit (though not quite simultaneously, but in Chapter ). The
latter consists in two parts: () arguing that meaning-talk does not commit us
to semantic facts even if there are, and especially if there are not, such facts; ()
explaining how the enjoyment of the benefit is not deplorable, but decent and
defensible.
 Despite excitement in the neighbourhood. Joyce () defends revolutionary fictionalism
about moral talk. Closer to home, Crimmins () and Kroon () defend fictionalist
interpretations of attitude reports, though that is not yet fictionalism about meaning proper.

Chapter 
To Repudiate an Ontology
In this Chapter there is first an argument for semantic anti-realism, first ex-
pounded (I think) by Kripke (); then there are some polemics against the
naturalising project, admirable as it is. It is not possible here to survey all
the naturalising proposals or to examine any one of them in great detail. So
I choose to proceed in a rather schematic manner, offering a basic anti-realist
move and showcasing its use against three major naturalising proposals. Al-
though schematic, if the basic move works we will have something very close
to a refutation of semantic realism (insofar as anything in philosophy can be
refuted).
. argument for semantic anti-realism
I shall define a few terms in order to state the argument precisely. Just for
brevity, call any physical system whatsoever a machine, and anything a machine
is supposed to do its function. A function is determinate iff every conceivable
machine-state is either a state of well-functioning, a state the machine is sup-
posed to be in, or a state of malfunction, a state the machine is supposed not
to be in. A determinate function is, as it were, maximally opinionated: it has
an opinion one way or the other of every conceivable machine-state. Being able
to support people less than  kg is a determinate function; a chair is either

well- or malfunctioning relative to this function even when it is empty. To be
sat on may be a function in the ordinary sense, but is not determinate; a chair
supposed to be sat on is not thereby supposed to remain occupied, and when
it is empty it is neither well- nor malfunctioning. (The way I defined things
allows a state of a multifunction machine to be well-functioning relative to one
of its functions and malfunctioning relative to another, and this is untidy. But
we shall have no use of multifunction machines, so I do not propose to tidy it
up.)
Now I state the argument. () Any machine capable of representing any-
thing at all can be regarded as having a unique, determinate function. That is,
it can be regarded as being supposed to do something both unique and deter-
minate in any circumstance. But () for any machine whatsoever, there are no
facts about what unique determinate function it has. Since anything capable
of doing any representation at all—human brains included—is by definition a
machine, the two premises jointly imply that there are no facts about what any
physical state represents. Mental states are brain, hence physical, states. So
there are no facts about what any mental state represents, or whether it repre-
sents at all.
Before we take a closer look at the argument, it is worth thinking about
something that is obviously a machine—a calculator, say—and see what the ar-
gument will say about it. A calculator is programmed to calculate sums, prod-
ucts and so on. In other words, it has such functions as addition and multiplica-
tion. Now the anti-realist argument does not deny (the fact) that the calculator
has these functions. It denies that there are facts about the calculator’s having
them.
And here is why: if there is any fact about what functions a calculator has it
can be no other than the fact about the programmer’s intention. Mere physical
 Externalists about content might want to identify mental states—at least those that apparently
have contents—with more than just the brain states. I’m fine with this. However the issue
between internalists and externalists is decided, it does not affect my argument.

facts about the calculator cut no ice. An exact physical replica of the calculator
with exactly the same operation history and dispositions might well have the
function of (say) quaddition if that was what its programmer intended; if the
replica doesn’t seem to be doing quaddition, it might just be malfunctioning.
But what facts ground the programmer’s intention that the calculator should
do addition, not quaddition? The programmer himself is as much a machine
as the calculator, only more complicated. What goes for the calculator goes for
the programmer: an exact physical replica of the programmer with exactly the
same physiological history and dispositions might well have intended quaddi-
tion. No fact can ground his intending addition rather than quaddition other
than the fact (if there is one) about another programmer’s intention, who pro-
grammed the first programmer. “A second programmer!” you say, “But what
grounds his intention? Intentional facts about a third programmer? This isn’t
going anywhere.” It isn’t indeed. There is no infinite series of programmers
in the world (nor are people usually programmed). So there is never a fact
about any programmer’s intending, or a machine’s having, a unique determi-
nate function.
To those familiar with the the so-called Kripkenstein literature, this argu-
ment may not sound very Kripkensteinian. As the usual story has it, Kripke
relies on meaning’s being “normative” in some dubiously strong sense: that
meaning is “prescriptive,” “action-guiding,” or “justificatory.” Here there is no
appeal to any of these: only what a machine is supposed to do given its func-
tion. Well, the argument I am presenting might just be Kripke’s (Section .
has more on this). But it does not really matter to my purpose whose argument
it is.
Now we take a closer look at the argument.

.. Premise One: Representation as Function
This premise does no real work. It is useful to have it though, as it gives us an
intuitive grip on the second premise which does do real work. And it is nearly
platitudinous: it follows from a triad of near-platitudes. () If a machine, by be-
ing in a certain state, represents anything at all, then it must be conceivable that
by being in that state it misrepresents, and for any conceivable machine-state it
must be a determinate matter whether, any time when the machine is in that
state, it misrepresents. (Notice the quantifiers.) () If a machine-state misrep-
resents, it is a state the machine is supposed not to be in, a state of malfunction.
(Alternatively: if a machine is misrepresenting, then it is in a state it is sup-
posed not to be in.) () Since for a machine to be in a state it is supposed not to
be in is just for it to malfunction, if a machine can conceivably misrepresent, it
must be conceivable that it malfunctions; and if, for any conceivable state, it is
determinate whether the machine is well- or malfunctioning while in that state
at any time, the machine must have a function that is not only determinate but
also unique.
Now (), I take it, is truly platitudinous. () is also uncontroversial. If a fuel
gauge is to represent the tank as containing a certain amount of liquid, it must
be conceivable that it misrepresents (and so it is: conceivably the gauge may
read “full” when the tank is not full). A gauge-state that cannot conceivably
represent the tank as being full when it isn’t full simply does not represent
the tank as being full. (In particular, the state of the gauge’s being full doesn’t
represent itself as being full.) And whether misrepresentation occurs on any
given occasion must be determinate because, if a machine represents anything
as being F, the extension of F must be determinate: anything must be either
F or not F. Otherwise “F” would be no predicate at all, and nothing can be
 Dretske () taught me how to get an intuitive grip on the issue. This section heavily draws
on his work.
 Liquid, not fuel; unless you are prepared—Dretske () and I are not—to call a gauge bro-
ken which reads “full” when the tank if full of water.
 Or, if F is vague, either definitely F or definitely not F or neither definitely F nor definitely

represented as falling under it. Now misrepresentation occurs just in case what
is represented as being F is not actually F. Which is just as determinate as the
extension of F.
I hope () is also obvious. If the gauge has a function that is indeterminate
(supposing that this makes sense at all), then for some conceivable gauge-state
there could be times when it is indeterminate whether the gauge is well- or
malfunctioning in that state. Such a gauge is incapable of representing any-
thing just so. Or if a gauge has more than one determinate function, then at
least for some conceivable gauge-state there could be times when it is indeter-
minate whether the gauge in that state is well- or malfunctioning simpliciter.
Such a gauge is incapable of representing anything either. All this goes just by
definition.
(Notice the word “conceivable.” This is what the malfunctioning states need
be for a machine to be capable of representation—or to have a unique determi-
nate function. The conceivable need not be actual or actually possible. A gauge
so cleverly built that it just cannot possibly give false readings is a gauge no less;
it’s just perfect. A gauge guarded by an angle that ensures that the tank always
contains the right amount of liquid is a gauge no less; it’s just lucky. Maybe
perfect and lucky gauges don’t exist, but if they did they would be gauges. So
long as there are states these gauges could conceivably (if not actually) be in
that they are supposed not to be in—and there are such states, such as read-
ing “full” when the tank is empty—we shouldn’t hold their perfection or luck
against them.)
not F. For the present purpose, however, we can perhaps ignore vagueness.
 The requirement for uniqueness is somewhat superficial, really, since any apparently multi-
functional machine can be regarded as single-functional provided a way to eliminate relativity
to functions. Such as: a state is one of well-functioning simpliciter iff the machine is supposed
to be in that state relative to some of its functions, and malfunctioning simpliciter iff . . . rel-
ative to none. Or: well-functioning simpliciter iff . . . relative to the majority of the functions
weighted by importance, and malfunctioning simpliciter iff . . . relative to the minority. So
when I claim later in this Chapter that no facts can ground a unique, determinate function
for any machine, I can be understood as claiming more generally that no facts can ground any
way of eliminating relativity to functions as the privileged way.

So we arrive at the following schema: 
State s, of machine M,
represents x as being F.
M is supposed to go into s iff x is F.
M has the unique determinate
function to go into s iff x is F.
The arrows mean “can be regarded as (or implies) . . . for the purpose of the
anti-realist argument.” They do not mean anything more than that.
.. Premise Two: No Fact about Function
A brilliant engineer wanted to build a machine to detect cows. He went on and
built one and called it the Golden Calf (this name is not arbitrary). Then he suf-
fered amnesia and forgot a crucial thing: what the Calf is supposed to do. He
still has all the facts before him: how the parts of the Calf are causally related;
how it behaved; how it was, is, and will be disposed to behave—indeed, every-
thing physical there is to know about this world and all possible worlds. But if
the second premise is true, he would not know what the Calf is supposed to do.
He would know this by knowing everything physical there is to know only if
the Calf’s function is physically grounded: but the second premise claims that
it is not.
It is easier to think about this case from the negative side: how could the
engineer possibly figure out what the Calf is supposed not to do? We may grant
that the Calf has a unique determinate function and that the engineer already
 Notice the direction of the implication: if a machine represents, then it can be regarded as
having a unique determinate function. I do not claim the reverse.
 This is the simplest case, but suffices for the present purpose. We can ignore more complicated
cases such as s’s representing x as being F and G, or as being F if it is G or H.

knows this—he just does not know which function it is. (This already makes
his problem unduly easy.) So he would figure out what the Calf is supposed
to do if, but only if, he figured out what the Calf is supposed not do in any
conceivable circumstance—or, equivalently, what it would be like for the Calf
to malfunction in any conceivable circumstance. So consider how he may try to
figure out this.
The engineer may be inclined to regard some conceivable Calf-states as
states of malfunctioning: gears slipping, wires melting, the whole thing burn-
ing down. But whether he would be right in so regarding depends, of course, on
his pre-amnesia intention. He might well have intended (why not?) to “make
use of the fact that wires melt or gears slip, so that a machine that is ‘malfunc-
tioning’ for [him now] is behaving perfectly for [him pre-amnesia]” (Kripke
: –). Unless the engineer had access to his pre-amnesia intention,
which apparently he has not (more on this later), this simple and fast method
would not work.
Or the engineer might try some principle of charity. Maybe the Calf should
be supposed to do what it did best. Suppose that it had been beeping whenever
a cow was within a hundred yards, until yesterday when a wire melted, after
which it sat around doing nothing. If the Calf is supposed to detect nearby
cows it has an excellent record; if it is supposed to melt wires and sit around,
it apparently has a poor record. Charity dictates that something that was a
much better cow-detector than a wire-melter or sit-arounder be considered a
cow-detector.
This does not work either. If the car you bought is missing the engines, you
do not come to think charitably that you bought a life-size model. Charity goes
only so far; it is the intention of the car maker that has the last word. (Matters
are more complicated when we move from artifacts to evolved organisms, of
which more later.) Also that particular principle of charity—taking the Calf as
supposed to do what it did best—amounts to assuming that it had never mal-
functioned. For there is bound to be a function, if only a hideously disjunctive

one, that can be attributed to the Calf in light of which anything it did no mat-
ter what would be just what it was supposed to do. But it would be unwise of
the engineer to be so charitable. He has no reason to rule out the possibility
of actual malfunctioning. (And to take the Calf as supposed to do what it did
and would do best is even worse; this amounts to assuming that it never would
malfunction.)
Lewis (b) argues that a principle of charity would work when aided
with a doctrine of naturalness. On his view, a person’s intending or represent-
ing something consists not only in what that person said or thought, but also in
the eligibility of the candidate contents. For Lewis, the more natural the candi-
date is the more eligible it is. Addition is more natural a function (“function”
in the mathematical sense) than quaddition and therefore more eligible to be
intended.
To intend to add, you need only have states that would fit either inter-
pretation and leave it to charity to decree that you have the more eligible
intention. To intend to quadd, you must say or think something that cre-
ates difficulties of fit for the more eligible intention and thereby defeats
the presumption in its favour. (Lewis b: )
Now I expect Lewis would say that cow-detecting is more natural a function
(“function” in the “supposed to do” sense) than cow-detecting-or-wire-melting
or cow-detecting-until-time-t-and-wire-melting-after-that. So if the engineer
did not say or think anything unusual pre-amnesia, cow-detecting, assuming
nothing else is more natural, would be the Calf’s function by default, thanks to
charity.
This proposal remains moot until we know how to measure naturalness, and
I doubt we will. But suppose we do. There still is trouble. Addition seems vastly
more natural than quaddition and it is not wholly implausible that the vastly
more natural candidate should win by default. But there are close contentions.
Suppose I wrote down a series of alternating  and − as I neither said nor
thought anything in particular. Which did I intend: (a) begin with , subtract 
for the next number and add it back for the third, and so on; or (b) begin with

, and always multiply by − to get the next number; or (c) just go on like this:
, −, , −, . . . ?
All three candidates fit my behaviour and dispositions equally well; charity
doesn’t break the tie. How then is naturalness supposed to break it? Addition
may be more natural than multiplication, positive integers may be more nat-
ural than negative ones, uniformity may be more natural than alternation, a
primitive “go on like this” may be more natural than a structured intention—
let them fight. But if we can measure naturalness, the fight has a result. And
if no two candidates are tied at the top but the most natural candidate is just
so very slightly more natural than the runner-up, we face a choice: either the
most natural candidate is what I intended, or it isn’t. Lewis would not like the
second alternative, for it implies that naturalness does not have the final say
in this case, and this raises the question whether it ever does in any such case.
He might like the first alternative, but it is implausible: why should so slight a
difference in naturalness make so big a difference in what I intended? I find it
hard to imagine what a Lewisian might say in reply, but in any case I doubt he
has an easy way out.
Naturalness aside, there is a more fundamental problem with any appeal
to eligibility: whether eligibility is cashed out as naturalness, charitableness,
simplicity, or what have you, it is simply beside the point. For the most we can
say with eligibility is that one candidate content is more eligible than another.
But even the most eligible candidate is not ipso facto represented. (The most
deserving hero is not ipso facto married to the princess. She may be a spinster.)
Yet the present question is precisely whether anything is ever represented at
all.
Thus consider the two ways an appeal to eligibility might go. One might say
that cow-detecting is the most eligible-to-be-represented simpliciter. But even if
 Kripke makes a similar, perhaps essentially the same, point: “simplicity considerations can
help us decide between competing hypotheses, but they obviously can never tell us what the
competing hypotheses are” (Kripke : ). What goes for simplicity in particular goes for
eligibility in general, simplicity being just one possible measure of eligibility.

this is true, the most eligible candidate is not ipso facto represented by the Calf.
Highly eligible candidates such as cows are not represented by (say) the Milky
Way, for in itself the Milky Way just isn’t capable of representation. A story
remains to be told about why the Calf is capable of representing anything, and
here eligibility is of no help. Alternatively, one might say that cow-detecting is
the most eligible-to-be represented-by-the-Calf. But this begs the question by
assuming that the Calf is capable of representation. Recall that the engineer’s
problem is not to pick from a pool of candidates the one that is represented,
taking for granted that the Calf does represent. His problem is to figure out
whether the Calf represents at all. (The problem is not to find the groom among
imposters, but to find out the marital status of the princess. Heroic virtues are
irrelevant.)
By now you may have become impatient: “It should have been obvious from
the start that the machine itself is not the place to look for its function. As
you yourself have hinted (many times!), the machine derives its function from
the engineer’s pre-amnesia intentions. Find the facts about his intentions, and
those facts would be the facts—which you claim are nonexistent—about the
Calf’s function.”
Reply: the engineer’s brain (or plus the world around it, if you insist) is as
much a machine as the Calf. If the engineer tried to read off his own intention
from his brain, his task wouldn’t be essentially different from the task of read-
ing off his own intention from the Calf. If he can’t succeed with the Calf, there is
apparently no reason why he should succeed with his own brain. Apparently,
physical facts cannot settle whether the engineer’s brain misrepresented—or
malfunctioned, getting in brain states it isn’t supposed to get into—on a given
occasion any more than they can settle whether the Calf malfunctioned on a
given occasion. And there is no representation without determinate misrepre-
sentation.




I argued that all machines are equal. But the naturalisers say that some ma-
chines are more equal than others. They believe that some machines—smart
enough to learn, or having gone through the right sort of history, or located
in the right world among the worlds—do have non-derivative representational
capacities that are physically grounded. If I am right, there is nothing the en-
gineer could do in building the Calf to imprint his intention unambiguously
on the physical world. If the naturalisers are right, there is something he could
do. I shall examine three pieces of advice the naturalisers have offered the
engineer. They come from Dretske (), Millikan () and Fodor ()
respectively. Before examining each one in some detail, a few remarks about
all of them.
First, it seems that a broadly informational account is naturalisers’ best bet.
Information is produced by lawful covariance: one event E (type or token) car-
ries information about another event P (type or token) just in case it is a law,
or at least a counterfactual-supporting regularity, that if E happened then P
must have happened or would happen; in short, no E without P (Dretske ;
Fodor ).
I should emphasise right away—since I’m going to say things that may seem
to suggest otherwise—that causation and information-carrying do not imply
 They are more or less in one boat, namely the causal-informational-historical boat, the feature
of which will be described shortly. Two other major boats are picture theory (e.g. the Tractatus)
and conceptual role theory (e.g. Block ). I will not consider them here, because: ()
picture theory is generally considered a lost cause and is not widely held today; and () I
think it is a good bet that conceptual theories will turn out to allow enough indeterminacy of
content to render semantic anti-realism true anyway, or at least as nearly true as I need it to
be for the purpose of the arguments in the next Chapter.
 People disagree on the technical issue of how fallible the relation is allowed to be. For Dretske
(), whom I follow, the relation has to be a hundred per cent infallible. For Fodor ()
there can be more lapses. But for our purpose this doesn’t matter.
 Notice the asymmetry in the definition. Where E carries information about P, it doesn’t follow
that P also carries information about E. It is possible that P could still occur or have occurred
even if E didn’t. For an example close to (Dretske’s) home, someone’s living in Madison,
Wisconsin, carries the information that he lives in Wisconsin. But his living in Wisconsin
doesn’t carry the information that he lives in Madison.

each other. Often they go together, but sometimes they come apart (Dretske
: ). That today is Tuesday carries information about what day is tomor-
row without being caused by it. My copy of today’s Times carries information
about what your copy says, and your copy carries information about what mine
says, but neither copy causes the other to say what it does. In the other direc-
tion, if an event could have been caused by more than one event then it carries
no information about its actual cause: criminals typically dream of achieving
just this. With these cautions entered, however, from now on I’m going to ig-
nore non-causal information-carrying and speak as though information were
carried along only via direct causal links, since this is the most relevant case for
our purpose.
Now we can see, with a celebrated example (the one Grice used to illus-
trate “natural meaning”), why naturalisers look to information. Dark clouds,
let’s say, carry information about an approaching storm: it is a lawlike regular-
ity that if clouds darkened, a storm would be coming. But speaking loosely
we may and sometimes do say that dark clouds “mean” a storm is approach-
ing. Information-carrying looks somewhat like meaning. True, strictly speaking
dark clouds do not mean that a storm is approaching in the way “A storm is ap-
proaching” does. The sentence can be uttered on a fine day and misrepresent,
while clouds can’t help being honest. So an information-carrying state is still
far from being truly representational. But on this point both the naturalisers
and I agree: just as the colloquial conflation of meaning and information sug-
gests, information-carrying states are as close to being truly representational as
physical states ever get. If they do not hold the naturalising promise, nothing
would.
The second point qualifies the first: only distal information carriers hold the
promise. This unpacks as follows. Proximal information is information about
the most immediate cause or, more loosely, about a cause that is sufficiently
 Not quite, but let’s pretend this is the case.

close to the effect on a causal chain. (I’m keeping my promise to ignore non-
causal cases of information-carrying.) Distal information is information about
distant causes. Suppose the burglar’s crowbar damaged the door in such a way
as to throw photons onto the detective’s retina in a certain pattern, which in
turn caused the detective’s brain to go into a certain state. The information
the detective’s brain state carries about the pattern of irritation on his retina is
proximal, and the information it carries about the damage to the door is more
distal. Whether it carries the information, still more distant, about the use of
the crowbar or the presence of a burglar depends on whether the detective’s
brain state covaries with these events in a sufficiently lawlike manner. (Proba-
bly not; even Sherlock Holmes does not solve cases as a matter of nomological
necessity.)
Most states carry both proximal and distal information. But a distal infor-
mation carrier is not (or not merely) a distal information-carrying state. It is
a state that has the function to carry distal information. Thus, although cos-
mic background radiation has been carrying the distal information about the
early universe for billions of years, it had not been a distal information carrier
until (I guess) of late, when human beings finally began studying it to learn
about the early universe, thereby assigning it an information-carrying func-
tion. A doorbell—Dretske’s () pet example—is also a distal information
carrier, supposed to carry information about visitors. Even a broken doorbell,
no longer capable of carrying that information, is a carrier no less. By contrast,
the sound of a visitor stumbling onto the door may carry the information but is
not a carrier.
As you may have expected, there are also proximal information carriers:
states whose function is to carry proximal information. But there is a huge
difference between proximate and distal carriers. A distal carrier can misrep-
resent in quite ordinary circumstances; a broken doorbell does. But when the
information carried is sufficiently proximal, it is a law that proximal carriers do
not misrepresent. The reason for this is simple. Take a stupid detective’s brain

state (stupidity is optional, but highlights the point). It does not covary in any
reliable way with the presence of the burglar. It may covary more reliably with
the damage to the door—but still not too reliably, since the detective may have
left his glasses home. Much more reliable is the covariation between the detec-
tive’s brain state and the stimuli to his retina; this covariation is lawlike, pro-
vided the detective’s visual system works normally. As we move closer to the
information-carrying state along the causal chain, the covariance becomes in-
creasingly strict and, eventually, it becomes lawlike. It would be broken only if
some law were broken. But laws are unbreakable. As a matter of law, therefore,
such a proximal information carrier cannot fail to do its job. (Law-breaking is
still conceivable, thus malfunctioning is still conceivable, if not actually possi-
ble, for such proximal information carriers. So they get to keep their status as
carriers.)
So if you are looking for physically grounded representation, proximal car-
riers are a bad place to look, if only because the threshold for misrepresenta-
tion should not be so high as to require law-breaking. Distal carriers are more
promising.
Which leads to my third and final point: representation can be naturalised
only if distal information carriers are physically distinguishable from proximal
information carriers—or, to put it another way, only if this difference in function
is grounded in physical facts. Notice, however, that distal information-carrying
entails proximal information-carrying. A state carrying any distal information
at all must carry some corresponding proximal information. The naturalisers
must therefore explain in physical terms why a state should be regarded as a
distal carrier rather than a corresponding proximal carrier. This isn’t easy, to
say the least.
Dretske () illustrates this third point with a nice real example. In the
northern hemisphere there lives a kind of bacteria that only survive in oxygen-
free water. They have evolved built-in magnetosomes that align themselves
toward the magnetic north, hence downward and away from the oxygen-rich

surface water. Then some mischievous scientists take some of these bacteria
to the southern hemisphere, where the magnetic lines of force run in the op-
posite direction. Magnetosomes backfire, and these bacteria swim upward to
their death. Now granted that the magnetosomes are information carriers (we
will question this later): do they malfunction in the southern hemisphere? As
Dretske rightly points out, if these magnetosomes are supposed to carry infor-
mation about the whereabouts of oxygen—a piece of distal information—then
they do malfunction. The possibility of malfunctioning makes them look like
true representational machines. But if they are supposed to carry information
about the locally dominant magnetic field—a sufficiently proximal piece—then
it is a law that they do not malfunction. This makes them look unlike genuine
representational machines. The moral of the story: if there is no fact about
which pieces of information the magnetosomes are supposed to carry, there
would be no fact about what they represent, or indeed whether they represent
at all.
This third point suggests a basic anti-realist move: find a Rival. There are
two ways to do this. () To find another distal Rival: whenever some state is
advertised as a carrier supposed to carry some distal information I, try to paint
it as a carrier of some other distal information I* (the Rival). The aim is not to
show that the state in question is in fact an I*-carrier or an I-or-I*-carrier rather
than an I-carrier, but that it could be any of these and there is no fact about
which it is. () To find a proximal Rival: whenever some state is advertised as
a distal carrier, no matter what distal information it is supposed to carry, paint
it as a suitable proximal carrier (there is bound to be one). Again the aim is not
to show that the state in question is in fact a proximal carrier, but that there is




Dretske has two ideas. First, why think of any information-carrying state as
a carrier at all? We granted that the magnetosomes are carriers, but we may
ask why. Dretske’s answer is an etiological account of function: if a mechanism
was “developed . . . because [it] played a vital information-gathering role in the
species’s adaptation,” then that mechanism has the function of gathering and
carrying that information (: ). Generally, if a type of things’ doing X in
the past explains why they are around today, then it is the function of this type
of things to do X. (This applies to both evolved organisms and artifacts, but only
states of organisms have non-derivative functions.) So if the magnetosomes
are around today because they carried information about the whereabouts of
the oxygen-free water in the past, then it is their function to carry that infor-
mation.
This etiological account alone does not guarantee a unique function, let
alone a unique function to carry distal information. It may be said with equal
right that the magnetosomes are still around today because they carried infor-
mation about the local magnetic field. Here Dretske’s second idea, associative
learning, comes into play. Organism O is an associative learner if its tokening
of a state s, originally caused by some distal property P via any of the proximal
stimuli S1, S2, . . . , Sh, can be conditioned to be caused by an arbitrary new stim-
ulus Si . So conditioned, O’s tokening of s would be caused by any member of
the set {Sn}, n = 1, 2, . . . , i, even absent P. Dretske claims that such an organism
is truly capable of representing P because, while s carries distal information
about P just in case it carries proximal information about a disjunctive set of
 On the other hand, all machines may have derivative functions. Gauges have the function
of carrying information about tanks: it is because they reliably carried that information that
they are made and installed to this day. It is just that their information-carrying function is
derivative.
 Here I’m not following Dretske faithfully. For me it is: property → proximal stimuli; for
Dretske it is: property→ distal stimuli→ proximal stimuli. But he proceeds as if the covari-
ance between distal and proximal stimuli is strictly lawful. So we can simplify away the distal
stimuli in the middle without misrepresenting Dretske’s account in any material way. If you
replace my “proximal” with “distal,” you get more or less Dretske’s original account.

stimuli {Sn} at any particular time, the set of proximal stimuli O may learn to
associate with P over time is open-ended and keeps changing, and so no time-
invariant disjunction of proximal stimuli would cause the tokening of s. Thus
s carries no time-invariant proximal information. If there is any time-invariant
information s is supposed to carry at all, it can only be the distal information
about P.
So Dretske would advise the engineer thus:
If you want the Calf to represent nearby cows by beeping, you can-
not just build it. Rather you must build an environment in which an
organism—maybe a calf—would evolve. And then it should evolve
to be an associative learner. It should be able to be conditioned
to associate the presence of cows with just any stimulus. Exposed
to cows that moo, it would learn to beep (moo?) on hearing moo-
ing sounds, and exposed to cows that wander near haystacks every
Tuesday, it would learn to beep at the presence of haystacks every
Tuesday. Make sure that the set of stimuli {Sn} the Calf would learn
to beep at is open-ended. This way you will have left a physical clue
in the world about what the beep represents: it represents its time-
invariant cause, namely cows. Cows cause the beep at all times, and
nothing else does this at all times. (Mooing sounds did not do so at
first, and may cease to do so if cows cease to moo.) So here you
are, representation read off from facts about causation. And mis-
 There are two arguments one can make here. First, one may argue that s cannot be a carrier of
information about an open disjunction simply because there is no such thing as information
about an open disjunction. An open disjunction has potentially everything (even the barely
possible) as its disjuncts. Since information by definition is that which excludes possibilities,
a piece of “information” that says that the one event among all the barely possible events oc-
curred excludes nothing and is no information at all. Second, one may argue that, though at
any particular time the set of proximal stimuli that would cause the tokening of s is finite, s
cannot be a carrier of information about a (closed) disjunction of those stimuli because that
would entail that s has a time-variant function, since the relevant closed disjunction varies
over time. But, as Dretske seems to think, if we accept the etiological account of function,
there is no reason to expect evolved mechanisms to have time-variant functions: this is “im-
plied by their continued . . . servicing of the associated [biological] need” (: ). Of the
two arguments Fodor emphasises the first (: –); whereas Dretske () seems to
rely exclusively on the second. But I shall grant his account the benefit of both.
 Dretske () does not include extinction (the breaking of an association) in his associative
learning model, but I think he should welcome it.

representation too: if a playback of mooing sounds causes the Calf
to beep, this would be a case of malfunction and misrepresentation.
Does this work? Not if we can find a distal Rival. Dretske proposes that the
function of the Calf’s beeping is to carry information about its time-invariant
cause, which he identifies as cows. But the time-invariant cause could be bulls,
provided the Calf is not perfect and can form wrong associations or break the
right ones. Below, Figures  and  show how the Calf would behave if every-
thing goes to plan. From time t1 (Figure ) through t2 (Figure ) there is no
time-invariant cause of beeping at the levels of proximal or distal stimuli, but
there is a time-invariant cause at the level of distal properties, namely cows. (I






































The arrows stand for lawful covariance. The rounded rectangle is the set
of proximal stimuli that lawfully cause the beep (the shaded diamond s).

But as with everything of a worldly origin, the Calf may be imperfect, and
things may go wrong. Starting from Figure , the Calf may become not what
is depicted by Figure , but something as depicted by Figure . In this case
again there is no time-invariant cause of beeping at the levels of stimuli and
one time-invariant cause at the level of distal properties—but this time it’s the
bulls.
The fatal problem is this. If things are as Figures  and  show, the Calf may
be a bad associative-learning cow-detector or a good associative-learning bull-
detector. And if things are as Figures  and  show, then the Calf may be a good
cow-detector or a bad bull-detector (or a very bad crocodile-detector, or . . . ).
Either way, the engineer can know everything physical there is to know—in
particular, everything Dretske would advise him to know—and still not know
which detector the Calf is, or even whether it is a detector at all. The crucial
clue that is missing is of course whether the Calf has learned the right associa-
tions. But this the engineer would not know unless he had known what asso-
ciations the Calf is supposed to learn in the first place, which, unfortunately, is
exactly what he has to figure out. (That the Calf has an evolutionary history,
is a descendent from good learners, is neither here nor there. Infallibility is
not inheritable.) No fact, therefore, grounds the Calf as a cow-detector as op-
posed to a bull- or crocodile-detector or a non-detector, associative learning to
no avail.
We can also find a proximal Rival. Forget about Figure  and suppose that
everything goes to plan as Figures  and  show. Is it really so that the beep’s
being a proximal information carrier is incompatible with its having a time-
 Loewer () makes a similar point. He says, in effect, that we can find Rivals in counterfac-
tual situations. He grants that in normal conditions everything would go to plan, but argues
that the set of proximal stimuli {Sn} would be closed-ended if its membership were restricted
to stimuli at any one world. To open it up Dretske must, Loewer argues, factor in counterfac-
tual conditions, and hence conditions under which things do not quite go to plan. I am not
sure if Loewer’s objection succeeds, for Dretske’s way of eliminating proximal disjunction re-
lies not so much on open-endedness as on time-invariance (see n.  above). My objection may
be an improvement on Loewer’s, in that it does not depend on which way Dretske eliminates
disjunction.

invariant function? I propose that the following is both a function to carry
proximal information and time-invariant: the function to carry information
about the disjunction of the proximal stimuli that, at any given time t, were
associated with the occurrence of cows at t. Time-variance is built into this
function as a parameter determining when the Calf is supposed to beep; the
function itself remains the same over time. And there seems to be no fact about
whether it is this function or the cow-detecting function that is what the Calf
has. The former seems as qualified a function as the latter on Dretske’s own
etiological account. Whichever role it is that the beeping performed—to de-
tect cows or to detect proximal stimuli associated with cows—its playing the
role contributed to its own preservation and proliferation to just the same de-
gree. It is the contribution that matters, not the description under which it is
contributed.
So uniqueness is lost, and with it the determinacy of misrepresentation and
all that hinges on it. The Calf may fail to detect cows, but as matter of law it can-
not fail to detect at any time the proximal stimuli associated with cows. What-
ever wild associations it learns, it would always be a perfect cow-associated-
stimuli-detector. If no fact grounds the Calf as a cow-detector as opposed to a
cow-associated-stimuli-detector, there is no fact about whether any of its beeps
misrepresents, and no fact about whether the beeps are doing any representing
at all.
.. Against Millikan
Unlike Dretske, who seeks uniqueness in the information carrier or the pro-
ducer of the purported representation, Millikan seeks it in the information user
or (as she calls it) the consumer. The consumer is not just a state or mechanism
that receives information: it is a state or mechanism that has the function of re-
 One can perhaps see it this way: Millikan thinks her consumer will do the job that Dretske
wanted (but failed) to do with associative learning, namely, to ground the uniqueness of an
information-carrying function. This seems to be how Millikan herself sees it, too (: ).

acting in some specific way to the information it receives. Cracked buildings
and shivering seismometers both receive information about the earthquake, but
only seismometers are consumers. Shivering is how they are supposed to react.
Being cracked, though perfectly understandable, is not how buildings are sup-
posed to react.
An apology is in order before I proceed. Almost everything Millikan says
on this subject refers back to her () magna opus, but the theory presented
there is more intricate than I can do justice to here. I shall set things up just
enough to make Millikan’s strategy clear (we will be looking at the broad strat-
egy anyway):
) A type of thing has the proper function to do X if (a) its having done X
in the past is why it has been naturally selected, or (b) it is produced by
another type of thing whose proper function is to produce it to do X.
Thus eyes, even damaged or ill-formed ones, has the proper function to
see, and tears have the proper function to lubricate eyeballs.
) A normal explanation is a general and complete account of how histori-
cally a type of thing R performed its proper function f. It can be more
or less detailed. The most proximate explanation must mention the rele-
vant features of R, the historical conditions in which R performed f, and
the relevant laws of nature. The features, the conditions, and the laws
together should show “without gaps . . . how the setup leads to the per-
formance of [f ]” (Millikan : ). Thus a normal explanation of how
the vomiting reflex protected those who vomited (to use Millikan’s own
example) should mention, in addition to the relevant laws, the features
of the muscles involved in vomiting and of the mechanism that detected
poison, and the condition that those who vomited were in—that of being
food-poisoned.
) Normal conditions are the historical conditions that even the most proxi-
mate normal explanation must mention. And that’s what is normal about
 The first “if” defines direct proper function. The second defines derived proper function in terms
of direct proper function. The distinction between these two does not matter here.

them. Normal conditions need not be optimal, beneficial, average, or sta-
tistically common: one normal condition for the proper functioning of
our vomiting reflex is (after all) our ancestors’ being food-poisoned.
And here is Millikan’s strategy in a rather dense formulation:
Although a representation always is something that is produced by a sys-
tem whose proper function is to make that representation correspond by
rule to the world, what the rule of correspondence is, what gives definition
to this function, is determined entirely by the representation’s consumers.
. . . The content hangs only on there being a certain condition that would
be normal for performance of the consumer’s functions, namely, that a cer-
tain correspondence relation hold between sign and world, whatever those
functions may happen to be. (Millikan : –, emphasis modified.)
The idea is that it takes two to represent. There is the consumer who must
react to the producer to perform its (the consumer’s) proper function. And
then there has to be correspondence—correspondence by some specific rule—
between the producer-states and the states of the world, the holding of which is
a normal condition for the consumer’s proper functioning. What a producer-
state represents (what information it is its proper function to carry) can then be
read off, Millikan thinks, from the correspondence relation. If such a relation
holds between a producer-state and a distal property P, then that producer-state
represents P.
(Hence Millikan’s advice to the engineer: remember that there is no such
thing as an isolated cow-detector. A cow-detector must be at the same time
a cow-seeker, a cow-avoider, or some such system whose proper function is to
react to the beeps and depends for its proper functioning on the beeps’ carrying
information about cows. Have such an organism evolved (you can’t just build
it), and you will have left a physical clue in the world about what the beep
represents: cows.)
 Reaction to a systematic correspondence between producer-states and the states of the world is
one of the two properties a mechanism must have in order to qualify as a consumer (Millikan
: ). The other condition—not relevant to what follows, but for the record—is that the
consumer should be able to react not just to a single piece of representation, but to a system
of representations (Millikan : ). Analogy: if you understand “today” it cannot be that
you understand it just on a single day; you must understand a systematic rule for mapping
“today” to dates.

Since Millikan talks about magnetosomes and I will quote her, I shall set
the Calf aside and focus on magnetosomes too, which makes no real difference.
On my view (as on Dretske’s) those magnetosomes do not represent because
they do not represent anything uniquely. On Millikan’s view, however, they
do represent, and the uniqueness is (Millikan thinks) factually grounded. The
consumer in this case may be the whole bacterium minus the magentosome
(such tiny creature it is). Obviously one proper function of this consumer is
to push itself away from oxygen. And in performing this function it reacts—
rather passively, but this is no less a way of reacting—to the magnetosome’s
being aligned in a certain direction, by pushing in that direction. What the
direction of the magnetosome’s alignment represents can then be read off, says
Millikan, from the normal conditions for the consumer’s proper functioning: it
is the direction of the oxygen-free water, not the direction of the local magnetic
lines of force.
Why not the latter? After all, the two directions are one and the same in the
northern hemisphere, the normal condition in which the consumer historically
functioned.
Millikan’s answer is in terms of needs. The consumer, she says, does not need
to be aligned along local magnetic lines of force in order to function properly.
What it needs is to be aligned toward the oxygen-free water, and it needs that
alone:
What the magnetosome represents is only what its consumer requires that
it correspond to in order to perform their tasks. . . . What they need is
only that the pull be in the direction of oxygen-free water at the time. . . .
[T]hey care not at all how it came about that the pull is in that direction;
the magnetosome that points toward oxygen-free water quite by accident
and not in accordance with any normal explanation will do just as well
. . . What the magnetosome represents, then, is univocal; it represents only
the direction of oxygen-free water. (Millikan : , her emphases.)
This seems quite wrong, and we can find a proximal Rival for the mag-
netosome to carry: information about the direction of local magnetic lines of
 So too it seems to Fodor (, ), but he doesn’t put his objection quite the same way.

force. Suppose someone takes the opposite view: “What the bacteria need
is only that the pull be in the direction of local magnetic lines of force. They
care not at all how it came about that the pull is in that direction, and the mag-
netosome that points in the direction of local magnetic lines of force quite by
accident will do just as well . . . ” What could possibly be wrong with this, by
Millikan’s own lights? After all, in the historically normal conditions the local
magnetic lines of force and the oxygen-free water were in the same direction.
In explaining how the bacteria survived to this day we may mention as a nor-
mal condition that their magnetosomes’ were aligned toward the oxygen-free
water. But we may mention instead that the magnetosomes’ were aligned along
the local magnetic lines of force, which, we add, pointed to the oxygen-free wa-
ter. This latter explanation sounds just as good. If it really is as good, then
nothing in Millikan’s account tells us whether it is one direction or the other,
or either, or both, that the magnetosomes determinately represent. But there
is no such thing as indeterminate representation. If the magnetosomes do not
represent determinately, they do not represent, period. (So far what I have done
is merely repeating Fodor’s objection (Fodor ), albeit in Millikan’s native
language.)
Millikan tries to meet the objection in several places, but the point she
makes is the same everywhere. The point is that to say that “They need the pull
to be toward the oxygen-free water” is in some way better than to say “They
need the pull to be along the local magnetic lines of force.” But of course this
only raises the question: better in what way? Better as a matter of real, physical
fact?
Surely the two ways of putting things (for want of a better phrase) do not
differ in the need they attribute to the bacteria. Words like “need,” “require,”
 This probably isn’t strictly proximal, but proximal enough to make misrepresentation as hard
as law-breaking—which is too hard for Millikan (as it should be). Millikan rejects the “prox-
imal hoverfly rule” as the rule followed by male hoverflies, apparently for this very reason
(b: –). Taking male hoverflies to be carriers of proximal information—taking them
to be followers of the proximal rule—does not make them remotely look like representing
machines.

“care” and so on can usually be taken in one of the two ways: de dicto or de re.
The need to communicate the plan to the president and the need to commu-
nicate it to the commander-in-chief are two needs de dicto, but one need de re
if the president and the commander-in-chief are the same person. Two needs
spoken of, one action needed. Likewise the need that the pull be toward the
oxygen-free water and the need that the pull be along the local magnetic lines
of force are two needs de dicto, but one need de re, since the two directions
happen to be one.
Now here is the rub. A need de dicto is intensional (with an s), so it must
be itself represented. Nothing has a need de dicto of anything unless it rep-
resents that need in some way. You can’t think of the need to report to the
president and the need to report to the commander-in-chief as two needs un-
less you can put the person who is both the president and the commander-in-
chief into two mental drawers. “Drawers” is, of course, just a colourful way
of saying “representations.” However, it cannot be a premise in Millikan’s
argument that the bacteria has a de dicto need for anything, represented either
derivatively or non-derivatively. Derivative representation—derived from we
humans attributing one need de dicto rather than another, extensionally equiv-
alent need—is irrelevant. That is not a distinction grounded in physical facts.
Non-derivative representation on the other hand is what Millikan is trying to
account for, and therefore cannot be assumed in advance. All Millikan has to
work with is needs de re. But in the historically normal conditions for the bac-
teria’s proper functioning—the only content-determining factors on Millikan’s
 To this general claim the following is perhaps a counterexample. Suppose all apples small
enough to go through a hole are as a matter of law green, and all those too big to go through
are red (a example made popular by Sober ; see also Millikan ). It sounds right to
say that in order to go through the hole the apples need be small, but need not be green, even
though the two needs are the same need de re, since it is a law that small apples are green and
vice versa. Thus the need to be green is de dicto, and yet it is not represented by apples. But
it is unclear how counterexamples of this kind can help Millikan. Fodor () says that they
do not, without bothering to give an argument. Here is a very brief suggestion: to make sense
of the need to be green and the need to be small’s being two needs rather than one, one must
invoke counterfactual situations—specifically, situations where actual laws fail. One must
ask what if green apples were big. But there is no obvious place for such considerations in
Millikan’s account. She goes to great length to confine herself to just what actually happened.

account—the two directions were one, and hence the two needs are the same
need de re, just described differently. This is not a difference grounded in phys-
ical facts (unless our descriptions—our representations—are already grounded
in facts).
Maybe the difference between the two ways of putting things lies elsewhere.
Perhaps in the way they figure in normal explanations? They may differ in sim-
plicity. Part of a normal explanation, recall, is the historically normal condi-
tions in which the bacteria properly functioned. It seems a simpler description
of a normal condition to say that the magnetosomes aligned themselves toward
the oxygen-free water; it seems a more complicated description to say, first,
that they aligned themselves along the local magnetic lines of force and, sec-
ond, that those lines pointed to the oxygen-free water. Maybe we should favour
the simpler description.
Or maybe the two ways of putting things differ in their explanatory ade-
quacy or relevance. The magnetosomes can hardly, if ever, fail to carry infor-
mation about the local magnetic field. But this, Millikan claims, does not nearly
explain the bacteria’s survival (b: –). It is the magnetosomes’ carry-
ing information about the direction of the oxygen-free water that does. Only
the latter explanation is “to the point,” so to speak, and this is good reason to
favour it.
I rejoin, first, that the two ways of putting things do not differ in adequacy
or relevance. Just saying that the magnetosomes carried information about the
local magnetic field is certainly neither adequate nor obviously relevant, but
saying this and that historically the local magnetic lines of force pointed toward
the oxygen-free water is adequate and relevant. (Saying that Smith bought a
lottery ticket doesn’t explain why he is suddenly so rich; adding that the ticket
was a winning one does.)
 Millikan () comes close to suggesting this, though I am not sure if she really means to.
Godfrey-Smith () also comes close.

All the burden, in the end, has to fall on simplicity. At this point I feel like
quitting, asserting that there is no fact of the matter about which explanation
is in itself simpler: simplicity is in the eyes of the beholder. (Unless one resorts
to something like Lewisian naturalness. But, I argued, this move may force you
to decide a grave fact of the matter on a seemingly negligible difference, which
you have good reason to be reluctant to do.) But maybe I can say something
stronger. Like Millikan (b: ), I have no general account of explanation
up my sleeve. But the following principle seems unassailable: if q and r entails
s, and s entails p, then the explanation “q and r, therefore p” is not more com-
plicated than “s, therefore p.” It’s just more detailed. (Maybe more complicated
in the sense that it tells you more than you want to know, but this sort of com-
plication is in the eyes of the beholder.) Thus the two explanations of Smith’s
wealth are equally simple: () he won a lottery; () he bought a lottery ticket,
and it was a winning one. The second explanation is longer by a few words,
but also contains more information (about how Smith won). It is no less sim-
ple for that. The two normal explanations of the bacteria’s proper functioning,
one mentioning the whereabouts of the oxygen-free water, and the other men-
tioning the local magnetic lines of force that happened to point to the oxygen-
free water, are likewise equally simple. One may prefer one explanation to the
other, but this is a fact about one’s brain, not a fact about what magnetosomes
represent.
.. Against Fodor
Fodor () would advise the engineer to place the Calf in the right world
among worlds:
If you want the Calf to represent cows by beeping, build it—no need
for the evolutionary detour—so that the following conditions are
met. () It is a law that cows cause the Calf’s beeping. () Cows,
for once at least, actually caused beeping. () If something other
than cows also causes beeping, its doing so asymmetrically depends

on cows’ doing so, in this sense: if cows did not now cause beeping,
that something would not now cause it either; but if that something
did not now cause beeping, cows still would (now). This way you
will have left a physical clue in the world about what the beep rep-
resents. It represents the unique F that satisfies the following: ()
it is a law that Fs cause beeping; () Fs did actually cause beeping;
and () all non-Fs’ causing beeping asymmetrically depends on Fs’
doing so.
Pace Fodor, here is a proximal Rival: the (probably hideous) disjunction
of all the proximal stimuli that lawfully cause the Calf’s beeping. Call this
disjunction cow*. By stipulation, any distal property that can cause beeping
only does so by first causing cow*. It follows that cow* satisfies () and ()
whenever cows do. Also, cows’ causing beeping asymmetrically depends on
cow*’s doing so: in the nearest worlds where cow* does not cause beeping nor
do cows, and in the nearest world where cows fail to cause cow* and hence
fail to cause beeping, cow* still succeeds. From this it further follows that if
any non-cow’s causing beeping asymmetrically depends on cows’ doing so, its
doing so also, and ultimately, depends on cow*’s doing so. Thus whenever
cows seem to satisfy ()–(), it is really cow* that does. So on Fodor’s own
account it really should be information about cow*, not cows, that the beep is
supposed to carry. But in that case it would take a law-breaking event for the
Calf to malfunction. This is enough to disqualify the Calf from being a true
representer.
Fodor concedes that if the stipulation of cow* is legitimate, his proposal
does not work. He claims, however, that it isn’t legitimate if the Calf’s beeping is
mediated by background theories. He wants to achieve with theory-mediation
what Dretske wants to achieve with associative leaning—the result that just any
proximal stimulus may cause the beep: “the barest whiff or glimpse of cow can
do the job for an observer who is suitably attuned. Less, indeed, than a whiff
or glimpse: a mere ripple in cow-infested waters may suffice to turn the trick”
(Fodor : –). If cow-detection is so mediated, Fodor seems to think,

cow* would be not only a hideous disjunction; it would be an open one. But
open disjunctions do not enter into laws (see n.  above). An open disjunction
of proximal stimuli that lawfully cause beeping or anything is a contradiction
in terms.
I rejoin that theory-mediation does not give rise to open disjunctions—at
least not so easily as Fodor makes it seem. What theory-mediation comes down
to is just there being some additional links in the causal chain between stim-
uli and reaction (beeping, in this case). What the “theory” comes down to is
just this web of intermediate links. But the whole mediation process is no less
law-governed for that, and for any stimulus that is proximal enough it would
be a law whether or not it would start a chain that culminates in the Calf beep-
ing. Now a finite machine—finite in size, running time, running speed and so
on—can have only a finite web at any given time, susceptible to only a finite
number of stimuli. In what sense, then, can it be true that “just any” prox-
imal stimulus can get a chain started that culminates in beeping? Well, if a
light bulb is attached to a maddeningly complicated circuit with millions of
switches then, in a sense, “just any” switch may turn on the light. This “just
any” reflects our ignorance. For all we know (and do not know), the switches
that will turn on the light are determined and finite in number. The disjunction
of these switches is not open but closed. Ignorance wouldn’t make it open. No
actual theory-mediation in a finite machine—or, what comes to the same thing,
no causal web that gets actually instantiated in a finite machine—gives rise to
open disjunctions.
What about possible theory-mediation? If it is possible, in a sense to be
clarified presently, for a finite machine to instantiate infinitely many theories
(causal webs), cow* might be open. But “possible” can mean either actually
possible, encompassing possibilities directly accessible from the actual world,
or possibly possible, encompassing all the possibilities that are accessible from
the actual world via any other accessible world at all. Either way the situation
is unclear. The number of theories that are actually possible for a machine to

instantiate, one may reasonably suppose, is finite, since all actual machines are
finite in size, running time, speed and so on. There are just so many ways such
a machine could be while taking care to meet Fodor’s three requirements. If so,
in order for cow* to be possibly open it has to be the case that: () those theories
that are actually impossible but possibly possible for the machine to instantiate
also count; and () the number of possibly possible theories is infinite. We are
already on quirky ground regarding actual possibilities. Now I have even less
of an idea as to whether either of these is true. This is perhaps an appropriate
place to quote Fodor (: ): “suggestions are gratefully solicited.” And
leave it at that.
If I have been correct so far, there is a strong prima facie case for semantic anti-
realism. Prima facie, all machines are equal. In the case of an artificial machine
no facts other than facts about its designer’s intention can ground a unique,
determinate function for the machine, but the designer’s intention itself awaits
grounding—and no grounding is forthcoming. Neither Dretske’s associative
learning nor Millikan’s normal explanations quite fits the bill. The jury may
still be out on Fodor’s asymmetric dependence, but there is good reason to be
sceptical.
If it does turn out that there is no factually grounded difference between
machines intentionally built and machines naturally evolved, the designer goes
the way of his machine, and we should resign ourselves to an austere reality:
you just can’t embody the semantic in the physical. (The Golden Calf is a mere
idol.)

. an exegetical appendix
Kripke’s argument is often thought to rely on the claim that facts about mean-
ings are “normative” in some strong sense, such as: () facts about what I mean
by “cow” must be such that I can cite them to justify my use of “cow” (Fodor
; Horwich ; Zalabardo ); () facts about what I mean by “cow”
must be capable of guiding or prescribing my use of “cow” (Hattiangadi );
or () facts about what I mean by “cow” must be facts about how I should use
“cow,” not just how I would use it, even if the circumstances are such that I
would necessarily use it the way I should (Wright ; Boghossian ; Fodor
; Horwich ).
Naturalisers dismiss these strong normativity theses as irrelevant. I think
they are right. The fundamental puzzle is not how words have meanings, but
how mental states have contents, and those strong normativity theses do not
even make much sense when applied to mental states. To be in a mental state
is just to be in a brain state, yet none of us have much control over what brains
states to be in, let alone have a justification for being in any. It cannot be a con-
straint on an adequate theory of representation that facts about representation
be strongly normative (in the sense that they are justificatory, or dictate what is
justified and what is not). Misrepresentation, on the other hand, is a relevant
constraint. If there are facts about representation, there should be facts about
misrepresentation as well. But misrepresentation involves normativity only in
a weak (that is, not strong) sense: to misrepresent is to be in a brain state when
the brain is not supposed to be in it. Accurate representation occurs just when
the brain is in the state it is supposed to be in. This is all there is to it:
To apply a term to a thing in its extension is to apply the term correctly;
once you’ve said what it is that makes the table the extension of ‘table’s,
there is surely no further question about why it’s correct to apply a table to
a table. . . . I am darkly suspicious that . . . the normative force of meaning
is either a nonissue or just the reduction issue over again. (Fodor : )
(If this were said regarding the application of terms in a public language like
English, it would seem plainly wrong. Suppose a child barely able to speak

applied “table” to a table. There is a further question whether he applied it
correctly. He might have meant chair by “table” but mistook a table for a chair.
Two wrongs make a seeming right, yet each remains a wrong. But Fodor is
here speaking not of terms in a public language, but of mental symbols (men-
tal states). He is right that if tables are in the extension of “table” and if the
tokening of “table” is suitably caused by a table, then it is ipso facto tokened
correctly. Meaning in a public language is largely a matter of convention and
one can get the convention wrong. But meaning in mentalese is (supposedly)
fixed by causal or historical facts: there is no convention one can possibly get
wrong.)
However, I do not think Kripke relies on any strong normativity thesis. This
is often clouded by his liberal use of words such as “justification,” but there are
revealing places where none of the dubius notions come into play. These are
pages – of his  book. There Kripke mentions an objection by Dum-
mett, which goes something like the following: “You say that giving myself a
rule for using ‘plus’ won’t do because I can always interpret it in a quus-like
way. But machines do not interpret rules bizarrely. Now surely I can build a
machine to do addition for me. Isn’t there a fact, then, about the machine’s
doing addition rather than quaddition? If there is such a fact about the ma-
chine, why not a similar fact about me? I am, after all, just a more sophisticated
machine.”
Kripke’s reply is that there is no such fact about the machine either:
The term ‘machine’ is here . . . ambiguous. . . . It may refer to a machine
program that I draw up, embodying my intentions as to the operation of
the machine. Then exactly the same problems arise for the program as
for the original symbol ‘+’ . . . . To say that a program is . . . an abstract
mathematical object, gets us no further. The problem then simply takes
the form of the question: what program (in the sense of abstract mathe-
matical object) corresponds to the ‘program’ I have written on paper (in
 I have taken some liberty in paraphrasing the objection, with an excuse: the objection that
Kripke replies to appears to be not exactly Dummett’s original. Kripke himself concedes
almost as much (: ). My paraphrase fits more Kripke’s reply than the original objection,
as I think is appropriate.

accordance with the way I meant it)? . . . Finally, however, I may build a
concrete machine, made of metal and gears (or transistors and wires), and
declare that it embodies the function I intend by ‘+’: the values that it
gives are the values of the function I intend. However, there are several
problems with this. . . . First, the machine is a finite object . . . Indefinitely
many programs extend the actual finite behaviour of the machine. . . . Sec-
ond, . . . [actual] machines can malfunction . . . How is it determined when
a malfunction occurs? By reference to the program of the machine, as in-
tended by the designer . . . A programmer with suitable intentions might
even have intended to make use of the fact that wires melt or gears slip,
so that a machine that is ‘malfunctioning’ for me is behaving perfectly for
him. (Kripke : –)
Kripke goes on to say that the problems of finitude and the possibility of
malfunction parallel his objections to dispositionalism. Then in a footnote, he
makes explicit the idea on which I have built in developing the anti-realist ar-
gument:
The dispositional theory views the subject himself as a kind of machine,
whose potential actions embody the function. So in this sense the disposi-
tional theory and the idea of the machine-as-embodying-the-function are
really one. . . . [Any] concrete physical object can be viewed as an imperfect
realization of many machine programs. (Kripke : , fn. )
So the sceptic’s challenge is indeed “to find a past fact that justifies my
present response.” Indeed, “almost all objections to the dispositional account
boils down to this one,” namely that dispositional facts cannot “tell me what I
ought to do each case” (Kripke : , his emphases). But if Kripke gets him-
self right—if his objections to dipositionalism do parallel the two problems he
noted in reply to Dummett—then the real point has essentially nothing to do
with justification or any other strong notion of normativity. The point is simply
that we cannot tell what (unique) program a machine, even a brain, is running,
just by looking at its history and dispositions. This is the very idea developed
in this Chapter.
What about the talk of justification and all that? These are probably dra-
matic devices. Supposing a machine has a function, then we may say that the
machine ought to behave this way or that; that it behaved as it should; that it
malfunctions. We can even justify its behaviour: “Don’t fix it; it ain’t broken.”

No such thing can be said of a machine that is functionless. Now if Jones is
just like a functionless machine, no such thing can be said of him either. So
the upshot of semantic anti-realism, no matter how one arrives at it, can always
be dramatised by saying that no fact “justifies” Jones’s using “plus” this way
rather than that. Dramatising the conclusion this way is consistent with relying
on strong normativity theses, but it is also consistent with not relying on them.
In Kripke’s case, I believe it is the latter, in light of what he says on pages –.

Chapter 
. . . While Enjoying Its Benefit
The sentence “ ‘Bachelor’ means unmarried man” is something a five year old
can readily understand, but intelligent philosophers who have thought long
and hard about it can’t agree on just what fact in the world it is true of. When
you come to think of it, it invites suspicion. Could it be that the very idea
that true sentences such as this are ever true of facts is mistaken, so intelligent
philosophers are looking for an answer that does not exist? In this Chapter
I will substantiate this suspicion. I will present two arguments for the Non-
Commitment Thesis: that our meaning-talk does not commit us to semantic facts
(facts that meaning-talk is supposedly true of), whether or not semantic facts
are.
“But how can a sentence be really true,” one might ask, “when it isn’t true
of anything real, and isn’t even meant to be true of anything real? You must end
up saying, implausibly, that it is really false after all.” I need not. With what I
call the Fictionalist Hypothesis, also sketched in this Chapter, we can make sense
of (really) true meaning-talk in face of anti-realism and Non-Commitment.
. an argument for non-commitment
) If meaning-talk commits us to semantic facts, then if there are no seman-
tic facts, all instances of meaning-talk are not true.

) There are so semantic facts.
) Some instances of meaning-talk are true.
) Therefore, meaning-talk does not commit us to semantic facts.
I hope you agree that () is obviously true. So is (): after all, we say truly when
we say that “bachelor” means unmarried man. No philosopher should deny
this. Moreover, to deny () is pragmatically self-defeating. If no instance of
“speaker S means m by expression e” is true, then no speaker ever means any-
thing by any expression. It follows that the denier does not mean anything by
his denial. So he could not have denied () after all (Soames ; Hattiangadi
).
() is controversial, though. In Chapter  I argued that it is true. If you are
convinced, well and good; you would accept (), the Non-Commitment Thesis,
without much hesitation. But maybe you aren’t convinced yet. It would be nice
if I could establish Non-Commitment in some other way, to which I now turn.
. another argument for non-commitment
This one is a bit longer, and comes with a story by Burgess and Rosen (: )
and Yablo (: ). Burgess and Rosen wrote the first two paragraphs, Yablo
wrote the last.
Finally, after years of waiting, it is your turn to put a question to the Oracle
of Philosophy. So you humbly approach and ask the question that has been
consuming you for as long as you can remember: “Tell me, O Oracle, what
there is. What sorts of things exist?”
To this the Oracle responds: “What? You want the whole list? Look, I
haven’t got all day. But I will tell you this: everything there is is concrete;
nothing there is is abstract. Now go away and don’t bother me.”
Trembling at the implication, you return to civilization to spread the
concrete gospel. Your first stop is [your university here], where researchers
are confidently reckoning validity in terms of models and insisting on –
functions as the condition of equinumerosity. Flipping over some work-
tables to get their attention, you demand that these practices be stopped
at once. The entities do not exist, hence all theoretical reliance on them
should cease. They, of course, tell you to bug off and am-scray. (Which,

come to think of it, is exactly what you yourself would do, if the situation
is reversed.)
The moral of the story, as Yablo () kindly points out, is that math-talk
does not commit math-talkers to mathematical objects. If it did, the concretist
gospel would be bad news for mathematicians by providing university admin-
istrations ample reason to lay them off. But, thanks to their non-commitment,
mathematicians are safe from ontological accidents (and, to a lesser degree,
from administrators). The object of ridicule is rather the table-flipping philoso-
pher.
A similar story can be told about meaning. This time—so it goes—you ask
the Oracle if there are semantic facts. “No.” “But . . . ,” knowing that semantic
realists will seek whatever refuge they can, you want to nail it safe, “But I won-
der if you mean there are no semantic facts of a particular kind, say physical,
or no semantic facts of any kind whatsoever?” To which the Oracle replies: “I
told you: no semantic facts of any kind.” Satisfied, you return to civilisation.
Having learned from experience, though, you do not immediately rush to na-
tional television to call for a ban on all meaning-talk. Instead you ask yourself:
What if I were to do that? Then you arrive at the conclusion (which has been
obvious all along) that you would be told to bug off just like before. Should
children not ask what “bachelor” means, and adults not answer them? Should
all dictionaries be burned? And be replaced by Quinean instructions as to the
appropriate verbal dispositions to cultivate? You recall that even Quine didn’t
go that far.
This suggests another argument for the Non-Commitment Thesis. It comes
in two versions:
The Oracle Argument (the empirical version)
a) If we wouldn’t have engaged in meaning-talk but for our commitment to
semantic facts, then on learning the semantic anti-realist gospel we would
abandon meaning-talk.

a) On learning the semantic anti-realist gospel we would still not abandon
meaning-talk.
a) We would have engaged in meaning-talk even if we did not commit our-
selves to semantic facts. (a, a)
a) It is gratuitous to attribute a commitment to a practice that would have
gone on all the same without the commitment.
a) Therefore, it is gratuitous to attribute to ourselves the commitment to
semantic facts. (a, a)
The Oracle Argument (the normative version)
b) If meaning-talk wouldn’t have been justified but for our commitment to
semantic facts, then we would not be justified to continue meaning-talk
if semantic facts did not exist.
b) If semantic facts did not exist, we would still be justified to continue
meaning-talk.
b) Meaning-talk would have been justified without our commitment to se-
mantic facts. (b, b)
b) It is gratuitous to attribute a commitment to a practice that would have
been justified all the same without the commitment.
b) Therefore, it is gratuitous to attribute to us meaning-talkers the commit-
ment to semantic facts. (b, b)
I suppose that (a), (b), (a) and (b) are fairly unobjectionable. Objections
may arise, though, to (a) and (b), and there may be counterarguments for
commitment. To these I now turn.
.. Objections and Replies
Objection . (a) is doubtful. Even if we wouldn’t have engaged in meaning-
talk but for our commitment to semantic facts, and it now turns out that the
commitment is unfulfilled, we might still decide to stick to meaning-talk no

matter what, since we find it so useful. We can’t give it up if life as we know it
is to go on.
And for that matter, maybe even the antecedents in (a) and (b) are false. If
meaning-talk is so useful, then maybe its utility alone is motivation and justifi-
cation enough. Then it is false that we would not have engaged in meaning-talk
or would not have been justified in doing so but for our commitment to seman-
tic facts.
Reply. I’m glad to concede that (a), and the antecedent in (a) and (b), may
well be false if utility alone provides motivation and justification enough. But
in that case the Non-Commitment Thesis can be supported in a different way.
For wherever utility alone provides motivation and justification enough, attri-
bution of would-be-unfulfilled commitment becomes implausible.
Here is an obvious case:
) One day Ricky the magic Pixie went to visit Daisy Bumble in her tumble-
down cottage.
None of the things named in () exists. A commitment to their existence, if
anyone were to take it up, would go unfulfilled (a would-be-unfulfilled com-
mitment). But we go on telling () to kids anyway and are justified in doing so,
for the utility is sufficient—in the sense that it adequately explains and justifies
our persistent use of (). This is a clear case where we have sufficient utility
and would-be-unfulfilled commitment on the one hand, and non-commitment
on the other.
One thing we don’t get from () is the direction of warranted inference.
Are we warranted to infer (a) given (b)? Or (b) given (a)? The next case makes
this clear.
Imagine an informant said:
) Kalaha Valley is where bin Laden will hide tonight.
 From Monty Python’s “Children’s stores.” Be warned that Monty Python is not for children.

Absent further information, it is natural to take () as committing the infor-
mant to a place named Kalaha Valley. But suppose that, when the Oracle of
Anti-Terrorism tells the informant that there is so such place, he replies that he
stands by () and is justified to do so, because to do so is useful. This would
be an odd response. Now we would be wondering how serious the informant
was: does he mean what he says? Is he insane or something? Or is he aim-
ing at something other than the capture of bin Laden? In any case, it seems
that the only way to make sense of him while taking seriously his claim about
utility is to suppose that he does not commit himself to a place named Kalaha
Valley—not in uttering (), anyway. In uttering () he may be intending to
mislead; or it may be a bad joke, or a piece of performance art. Here again,
there are sufficient utility and would-be-unfulfilled commitment on the one
hand and non-commitment on the other. But it is also clear in this case which
way the inference can go. Where commitment is the default assumption, it can
be rebutted by the conjunction of sufficient utility and would-be-unfulfilled
commitment (when known to be would-be-unfulfilled). This shows that non-
commitment can, in some cases at least, be inferred from sufficient utility and
would-be-unfulfilled commitment. (It doesn’t show the inference can’t go the
other way.)
A third example is from math-talk and, admittedly, more controversial:
) Fourteen is divisible by seven.
We would stand by () and be justified in doing so even if it turns out that
numbers do not exist, since arithmetic is so very useful. If sufficient utility
plus would-be-unfulfilled commitment (known to be would-be-unfulfilled) is
a good guide to non-commitment, we should expect that () does not commit
us to the existence of fourteen and seven. And so it doesn’t. As Yablo ()
argues, if numbers once existed but now evaporate, or if they have never ever
existed, arithmetic would still retain its point and indeed much of its old shape.
Instead of () we might just as well say: “Fourteen, if this number existed,
would be divisible by seven, if this number existed too;” and we would have

said all we wanted to say by uttering (). But if this non-committing para-
phrase exhausts all our interest in uttering (), why not say that it just is what
we have really been asserting whenever we asserted the apparently committing
()? To impute on ourselves a commitment whose fulfillment we do not care
is gratuitous.
Now I do not mean to suggest that a non-commitment thesis for math-talk
can be established just so. Perhaps none of the three examples on its own is
decisive. But their cumulative effect is something to reckon with. On the whole
it seems plausible that, if utility is (in our technical sense) sufficient even when,
and indeed especially when, semantic facts are known to be nonexistent, then
this fact itself gives us good reason to believe in the Non-Commitment Thesis.
So in the end, the first objection amounts to just this: there is another
argument—the Argument from Sufficient Utility—which, if sound, not only
shows that the original Oracle Argument isn’t quite right, but also proves the
point I aimed to prove with the Oracle Argument. To this the proper reply is:
thank you.
Objection . Mere acceptance of a discourse can commit you to what the dis-
course itself is committed to without you realising it. After all, if Platonism
is true (unlikely as it is), then many people do not realise that in relying on
arithmetic they have committed themselves to numbers. So while I agree that
we would persist in meaning-talk even in face of the anti-realist gospel, I don’t
see why this must be taken to be evidence for our non-commitment. Instead we
may take it to be evidence for our failure to realise our commitment. We may
believe that we are not committed to semantic facts when, in fact, we are.
Reply. For this objection to succeed, two things must be true. First, meaning-
talk automatically commits people who fully accept it to semantic facts. Sec-
ond, in engaging in meaning-talk we do fully accept its commitment. If we
 See Eklund () for a similar argument.

accept it with reservation—say, reservation regarding the existence of semantic
facts—then of course we are not committed to semantic facts, whatever else we
accept. Now I think the first claim is false (more on this later). But even if it is
true, the second claim is false.
Not to give myself any benefit of doubt, let’s imagine that we did every-
thing we could to declare our full acceptance of meaning-talk’s commitment.
We painted “We fully accept meaning-talk’s commitment” on walls and in sub-
ways, in so many words. Still, when the anti-realist gospel arrives, we do not
abandon meaning-talk; nor do we feel obliged to take any past meaning-talk
back. If this is the case (and I think it certainly is), then I do not think we
have really, ever, committed ourselves to semantic facts, words on subway walls
notwithstanding.
For while words have weight, deeds are more decisive. A self-serving politi-
cian is not really committed to serving public interest, his moving oath of office
notwithstanding. (The commitment in this case is not ontological, but the point
is the same.) If he has been self-serving all along, then he must have never been
committed to serving public interest, and the oath was probably taken in bad
faith. Now similar things can be said of ourselves in the scenario just imag-
ined. Granted that full acceptance of meaning-talk would commit us to seman-
tic facts, the way we would behave in face of the anti-realist gospel shows that
our acceptance is not full. It shows that we are as indifferent to semantic facts as
the self-serving politician is to public interest; it shows that we are not commit-
ted to the existence of semantic facts any more than the politician is to serving
public interest. And there is no reason to believe that we had not been indif-
ferent before learning the anti-realist gospel: there is no evidence for a change
of heart when we learned the gospel. (For the record, people to whom I told
the Oracle story tended to respond with a “So what?”, although they were often
polite enough not to put it that way.) The only plausible conclusion is therefore
that we have always been indifferent, and we have never committed ourselves
to semantic facts.

Could it be that we are wrong to be indifferent? Could it be that although
we do not care, we really ought to? I do not know what to make of this claim,
and I find it hard to think of a clear case where claims of this kind make sense.
Also, wherever such a claim is made it is almost always too controversial to
support anything similarly controversial (such as our commitment to semantic
facts). Again take numbers as an example. If we are indifferent to the existence
of numbers but our arithmetic is apparently no worse for that, then I do not
know what to make of the claim that we nonetheless ought to care about their
existence. And even if this claim does make some sense, surely its truth is in at
least as much doubt as the truth of the conclusion one might expect to follow
from it, namely that we are committed to the existence of numbers.
Objection . You do not know what to make of the claim that we ought to care
about the existence of semantic facts? Here is a suggestion, and it is essentially
the first claim you identified (and rejected without argument) in reply to Ob-
jection . Quine () teaches us that to be is to be indispensably quantified
over. If you accept a discourse D you ought to commit yourself to the enti-
ties that D cannot but quantify over in order to be true. If the best scientific
theory cannot but quantify over numbers, then to believe in science you ought
to believe in numbers. If the best scientific theory cannot but quantify over
sets, then to believe in science you ought to believe in sets. (As is well known,
this is how Quine and Putnam argued for commitment to mathematical ob-
jects (Field ).) Now you should agree that quantifying over meanings or
(say) synonymy relations is indispensable to the truth of meaning-talk. Dictio-
naries would be not only useless but positively false if, instead of synonymies,
they listed conditions under which linguistic expressions would be correctly
used, since any no non-semantic list of this kind is going to get the correctness
conditions wrong. So if we are to go on being meaning-talkers, we ought to
 Try, for example, to fill in the blank: the expression “Get off my toe!” is used correctly just in
case . As far as I (and the objector) can see, the only promising candidate is (something
like) “the speaker intends to tell the addressee in English to get off his toe.” If this intention

commit ourselves to what meaning-talk indispensibly quantifies over—namely
meanings.
Reply. I join Yablo () in rejecting the Quine-Putnam argument. Their ar-
gument may work for a theory’s subject matter, but not for a theory’s representa-
tional aids. The subject matter is (roughly) what the theory is about. Particles,
fields, force—things such as these are the subject matter of physics. Human be-
ings are the subject of demography. In general, for a theory to be true its subject
matter must exist: no true demography without people. Representational aids,
on the other hand, are mere devices for stating a theory, not what the theory is
about. They can be ontological mirage without compromising the truth of the
theory that uses them. The average family—a statistical construct, not a real
family that happens to be average—does not exist on a par with real families.
Nor is demography committed to its existence. But it is a legitimate represen-
tational aid to demography all the same. You can’t fault a demographic theory
for taking average.
Some representational aids are indispensable. Maybe numbers are. But why
should indispensability imply commitment? Consider this game played by two
masters:
Sixty-four slaves, called Callers, stood in a line each with a slab on
which was carved the names of thirteen discredited philosophical
doctrines. A Call involved a Caller calling out one of the names.
The rules of the game specified exhaustively which of the  possi-
ble Calls were legitimate at any stage of the game. (A thick rulebook
that was.) Thus the game may begin by Caller  calling out “Ni-
hilism!” and Caller  calling out “Logical positivism!”, and it then
is absent, the speaker misuses the expression even if his toe is stepped on. But intention is
semantic.
 Yablo’s () offers a different argument. He works from top down, taking a sentence loaded
with mathematical terms and arguing that nothing of interest will be lost if those terms fail
to refer: all we need do to get we want is to suppose that they succeed. I work from bottom
up, starting with something that is clearly non-referring and non-committing and gradually
modifying it into something indistinguishable from actual mathematics; which proves the
same point.

would become illegitimate for them to make the same Calls until
some further changes. The game was played in turn. For each turn
one master was to order two legitimate Calls.
How to win the game we will see shortly. The two masters also loved to com-
ment on their game. For example, Master Black might say:
If Caller , whose last Call was “Thing-in-itself,” calls out “Ni-
hilism,” then it will become legitimate for Caller  to call “Quasi-
realism” and, if he (Caller ) does, it will become legitimate after
two more Calls for Caller  whose last call was “Thing-in-itself” to
call “Quasi-realism,” whatever the intermediate Calls are.
As you may have guessed, this is a game of chess played in a roundabout
way. What Master Black said can be said in fewer words: “If the white knight
leaves f, Black can play queen-to-h, and there will be a checkmate.”
Now imagine that the masters lost some of the slaves. To manage with less
than sixty-four, they had to imagine some slave-images to stand in for the real
ones and keep track of their imaginary Calls. They managed that, and after
a while found real slaves quite dispensable. They now played with imaginary
slaves only.
Next imagine that the masters got bored of the old game. They changed the
rules so that for any imaginary slave it was legitimate to imagine one more, and
modified the goal of the game so that it was no longer competitive. The new
goal was just to see what Calls became legitimate as the game evolved. To us
the game looks just like the derivation of theorems from Peano’s axioms. And
by now you can guess what next. The masters imagined slaves between any
two slaves, countably many slaves, and finally uncountably many slaves. Just
by changing the rule book their game came to mimic most if not all mathemat-
ics perfectly. For any theoretical statement quantifying over the usual (if not
all) mathematical objects, the mathematical part can be paraphrased into the
masters’ comments on their game—only that the paraphrase may turn out to
be quite verbatim.

Did the masters ever commit themselves to mathematical objects? The an-
swer seems clear. In playing the roundabout chess they committed themselves
to no more than we would commit ourselves to in playing ordinary chess—that
is, nothing. But a mere change to the rules would not add to their commit-
ment either; it merely changed the game. As changes accumulated the game
became increasingly exotic, but at no stage did it commit the masters to more
than they had been committed to at the start. Since the masters were commit-
ted to nothing at the start, they were committed to nothing at the end. (Nor
would they be if after years of playing they succumbed to the illusion that they
were studying an abstract reality of imaginary slaves. They would not thereby
commit themselves to imaginary slaves; they would only misunderstand their
game.)
(To qualify the foregoing: I am not really sure if innocent changes to the
rule book can get us to all the mathematics as is practiced today. It may be that
some changes must themselves be represented with ontologically suspicious
mathematics. (The same doubt, I think, also applies to Yablo’s argument.) But
even so the next few paragraphs will remain sound, which is all I need for my
purpose.)
So representational aids, even indispensable ones, can be had free of onto-
logical charge: the masters had their game, and we have numbers. It remains to
ask whether we can have meanings this way. It might seem not: it might seem
that meaning-talk is about none other than meanings (synonymy, ambiguity,
meaninglessness, and so on). But this is to look at meaning-talk from too short
a distance.
Let’s step back and ask how language came about in the first place. Pre-
sumably it evolved as a solution to what Lewis () has called “coordina-
tion problems.” Suppose you know where the honey is, but only I can grab it
 Morris Kline asks: “Is mathematics a collection of diamonds hidden in the depths of the
universe and gradually unearthed, or is it a collection of synthetic stones manufactured by
man, yet so brilliant nevertheless that they bedazzle those mathematicians who are already
partially blinded by pride in their own creations?” (Kline : ) My answer: the latter.

and share it with you, and we can’t talk. We will both be better off if you can
do something to let me know what you know. But (initially at least) I do not
know how your behaviour is correlated with the whereabouts of honey, and
you do not know what effect your behaviour will have on my behaviour. We
face a problem of establishing cooperation, a coordination problem in Lewis’s
sense. It will be solved, of course, if we have a signalling system, whereby your
behaviour (the signal) is reliably correlated with the whereabouts of honey and
my behaviour is reliably correlated with yours, and the two correlations fit to-
gether so I find honey. If we are smart enough we can observe what the other
is doing and adjust our own behaviour to make this happen. But a signalling
system can also arise in blind evolution: if some bees happened to be fixated on
a behaviour pattern that produced the right kind of correlation, natural selec-
tion would ensure that they leave more offspring than other bees. Their pattern
would spread and perpetuate itself (Skyrms , ). To the best of our
knowledge, this is how language came about—indeed how it must have come
about.
If language is a gadget for producing and maintaining coordination, why
not think of the fragment of language that is meaning-talk this way? Outside
philosophy seminar rooms we are rarely, if ever, interested in talking about
meanings for their own sake. We take interest only when something else is
at stake. The following is, I think, a typical case. Suppose you and I, the
honey hunters, have established a signalling system whereby you tell me where
the honey is. Wary that all kinds of contingencies—noise, carelessness, bad
memory—are threatening to erode our system, I would like to recalibrate it
from time to time. With only correlations between your signals and the where-
 The problem has a technical definition that need not concern us (see Lewis : ). More
remarkable are the highly idealized conditions in which it is set. Did such conditions ever
obtain in evolution? But later work has shown that we need much less: siganlling systems can
emerge (and did emerge) in completely realistic settings (Searcy and Norwicki ; Skyrms
).
 Once we see that language could not have been invented by our prelinguistic ancestors agree-
ing on the uses of certain sounds, it is really hard to imagine it arising in any other way.

abouts of honey, however, I would only know that things have gone wrong when
they have gone badly wrong: when I fail to grab honey. If only we had corre-
lations between signals and signals, so that I could test one signal-honey cor-
relation against another! In that case mistake-detection would be much less
costly.
This is not a fancy idea. We do similar things all the time. For example, we
calibrate one thermometer—or one reading-temperature correlation—against
another. But to do this, and this is crucial, we must first establish sameness
of readings, a kind of “synonymy” between thermometers if you please. (Still
these readings do not mean the temperature is so and so—a point made in the
last Chapter.)
But meaning-talk is not just language’s self-calibrating gadget. It may well
be language’s self-assembly gadget as well. Our language stands out among
bee dances, whales songs, moth pheromones and monkey calls with its huge
vocabulary. It is hard to imagine how our brain, powerful as it is, could mas-
ter several thousand words so quickly if it had to learn each one of them in
isolation, each from scratch. But incredulity is no argument, so I should just
point to studies showing that bonobos learn much faster if they can learn new
words based on words previously learned. Homo sapiens are probably no dif-
ferent: thus being able to learn “bachelor” by learning that it means the same
as “unmarried man” (if this is already learned) is much more efficient than hav-
ing to learn both expressions separately. This suggests that meaning-talk has
something to do with language acquisition. To be sure, meaning-talk might
just be a superficial consequence of some deeper mechanism that exploits the
shortcut to previous learning, the cart pulled rather than the horse that is doing
the pulling. But more likely, I suspect, it does speed up learning somewhat by
making the shortcut visible and audible, and hence more salient. Although just
 Kanzi, the extraordinary and widely publicised bonobo who managed to master sign-to-sign
correlations, acquired so large a vocabulary, and at so fast a pace, as is simply impossible for
most non-human primates that could only learn each sign separately (Deacon ).

“somewhat,” this is often enough: even the tiniest adaptation gets entrenched
in evolution.
Very roughly, then, this is the picture I hope I have made plausible: our
meaning-talk is a gadget whose raison d’être is to help assemble and calibrate a
much larger gadget, and that much larger gadget is around because it did a good
job orienting us toward honey. While there is certainly a sense in which the
larger gadget—or rather the indicative part of it—is about honey, or true of the
way honey is, there is no reason to think of the smaller gadget as also about, or
true of, something as real as honey. Just as the masters’ game is purely for fun,
this small gadget appears to be just for building the large gadget and holding it
fast. And meanings are not its subject matters: they are its representational aids
(granted that it is so much as a theory, which is already a stretch for something
that is basically a gadget). Indispensable as these aids may be, they are still just
aids.
Objection . Show me how the Oracle Argument can avoid proving too much.
The Oracle is merely your mouthpiece and would say anything you have him.
What if you have him say that bachelors are married, that we do not know that
we have hands, or that no chair exists but only chair images or simples arranged
chair-wise? Even if it is an Oracle who says these, I bet that we would still go on
believing that bachelors are unmarried, that we know we have hands, and that
there are chairs (setting aside nihilists, who do not believe this anyway). Would
you then conclude that we are not committed to bachelors’ being unmarried, to
our mundane beliefs’ being knowledge, and so on? Isn’t this a bit too much?
Reply. The Oracle Argument does not have these consequences—at least not
the more unsavoury ones. There are three ways out. First, there are things a
true Oracle could not say. He could not announce a contradiction, an incoher-
ent statement, a conceptual falsehood, or nonsense. (Where the latter two oc-
curred, the Oracle would have used language incompetently.) If the Oracle said
any of these, the myth would debunk itself: he would be no true Oracle. And

no conclusion follows from a self-debunking myth. Second, there are things a
true Oracle might say but whose meaning would remain unknown to us if some
other things remained unknown. The Oracle might say “Today . . . ” and we do
not know the day on which he said it. Or he might say “Desks are flat” and we
do not know the less flat things he had in mind or the possibly flatter things he
did not have in mind. If the context is missing, the Oracle’s contextually sen-
sitive announcements would be fatally incomplete, and nothing follows from
them either. Third, what the Oracle said may be ambiguous, though this need
not be his faults. If there are inherent ambiguities in our language, then even
the Oracle can do nothing about it. In that case, again nothing follows from
what he says.
Now to the particular cases. “Married bachelor” is clearly something a true
Oracle could not have said. It is a conceptual falsehood. We get out via the first
way.
Then knowledge: I agree with Lewis () that “know” is context-sensitive.
(I will assume that Lewis is right. If you think he is wrong, the option for you is
the first way out: see case (b) below.) So if the context is missing, we get out via
the second way. But if the Oracle’s announcement comes complete with the con-
text, then there are three possibilities. (a) What he said—that we do not know
we have hands—was inappropriate in the context, maybe because the standard
of knowledge remained low. That would amount to a conceptual falsehood just
like “Bachelors are married.” And we get out the first way. (b) What the Or-
acle said was actually appropriate in the context—an extraordinary context to
be sure, but it can be created by raising the standard of knowledge higher and
higher and higher (which is sceptics’ stock-in-trade). In this case we should
accept the Oracle’s announcement in that extraordinary context. But this is
consistent with rejecting an assertion of the same sentence in ordinary contexts
where the standard of knowledge remains low. In those contexts we can stand
 Since anything than which something is flatter is not flat (Lewis , ).

by our claim to know our having hands. There is no conflict between this com-
mitment and the Oracle’s announcement. So the Oracle Argument does not get
started. Finally, (c) we may disagree on whether the Oracle’s announcement was
appropriate in the context. In this case we should each choose one of the two
options, (a) or (b), above. We would of course disagree on which one to choose,
but that is fine: no matter who is right, the Oracle Argument doesn’t get started
for any of us.
As for chairs, I myself am ready to believe that we are not really commit-
ted to them as opposed to images or simples. Why should an ordinary person
care whether he is sitting on a chair or a bunch of simples, so long as it does
not (they do not) collapse? So one option is to bite the bullet. But two more
options are open. First, the Oracle might have meant something different by
the existential quantifier than we do (Hirsch ). Thus if he said “There are
no chairs but only chair-images” or “. . . but only simples arranged chair-wise,”
this may well translate into our language as “There are chairs.” But we have
no way to be sure. This would be a case of inherent ambiguity that opens the
third way out. Alternatively, if the Oracle did quantify the same way as we do
then he would—and this is the option we can almost always fall back on—have
debunked himself with a piece of nonsense. Admittedly, this way out is avail-
able only to those who hold that whoever quantifies as we do but denies the
existence of chairs is not a competent speaker. But this seems a plausible view
in its own right.
The semantic anti-realist gospel, on the other hand, is not inconsistent or
incoherent or conceptually false or nonsensical, and there is no evidence for its
ambiguity or context-sensitivity. All the ways out are blocked. There should
be no escaping the Oracle Argument, from which the Non-Commitment Thesis
follows.

. the fictionalist hypothesis
With Non-Commitment in place, it is time to face harder questions. It seems
that truth-aptness only goes where commitment is, and shies away where com-
mitment is not. “By any other name would rose smell as sweet,” sincerely as-
serted in an ordinary context, would commit the speaker to rosey facts, and the
utterance (or the proposition expressed by the utterance, as some prefer to say)
would be either true or false. If the same sentence is uttered as a line on stage,
however, the utterance would not be ontologically committing. But in that case
nor does it have truth value: it isn’t even an assertion. Now if, as I argued,
uttering “ ‘Bachelor’ means unmarried man” does not commit the speaker to
facts about what “bachelor” means, how can this utterance be true? Or, for that
matter, false?
.. Searching for a Model
Without taking a wide enough look we may perhaps be impressed by the seem-
ing bond between truth-aptness and ontological commitment. But just look
around a little, and we will see that this impression is entirely illusory. Non-
committing truth-apt utterances are everywhere. We can, first, say things truly
or falsely of characters and events in fictions without being committed to their
existence:
) a. O’Brian is a member of Inner Party.
b. Julian’s attempt to assassinate Mme de Rènal upset many early com-
mentators.
Then there are idioms, an ontologically weightless piece of luggage that many
utterances take on board:
) a. He kicked the bucket.
b. It rains cats and dogs.
c. From the second act on the playwright jumped the shark.

Third, we have metaphors:
) a. Juliet is the sun.
b. The professor puts a lot of hurdles in his path. He falls into an abyss
of despair. (Yablo )
c. Jerry Fodor is a Granny’s boy. (Dennett )
d. God is dead, and we killed him. (Nietzsche , §)
Finally, make-believe:
) a. You ask where Crotone is? Look, this is Italy, and Crotone is on the
arch of the boot. (Walton )
b. To tie a bowline, first make a loop, and then say to yourself: the
rabbit comes out of the hole, goes under the log, and back into the
hole again—there you are. (Walton )
These examples should open our eyes and hearts to the idea that a discourse
can be both truth-apt and non-committing. Maybe meaning-talk is also like
this? This is the hypothesis I will be driving at, but its plausibility is not ob-
vious. One question is whether the relevant features of meaning-talk can be
found in at least one truth-apt, non-committing discourse other than meaning-
talk. If not, the hypothesis wouldn’t be terribly plausible; it would seem that
the kind of discourse which shares all the relevant features of meaning-talk,
and which is at once truth-apt and non-committing, is little more than my fan-
tasy. But if such a discourse does actually exist in natural language, then we
may reasonably suspect that it isn’t an isolated instance. This discourse will
also serve as a model for meaning-talk, the studying of which will shed light on
that which it models.
What are the relevant features of meaning-talk? Truth-aptness and non-
commitment aside, I see four of them: () meaning-talk requires no special
setting-up; () it is syntactically normal; () it is (usually) definite in meaning;
 This doesn’t commit Romeo to the existence of the sun.

and () it is unparaphraseable beyond a certain limit. All but one of the dis-
courses listed above has all four features. (I have given the end away: it’s the
last one.)
Explicit fiction-talk, as exemplified by (), is out immediately. Meaning-
talk typically occurs in non-fictitious contexts and does not require there to be
any prior work of fiction to be true. This is not so with utterances in (). If
Stendhal or George Orwell had never gone into writing, they would not even
have made sense.
Meaning-talk behaves syntactically like normal descriptive talk. We can (or
think we can) give a standard compositional semantics for it. It is this feature
of meaning-talk that gives you an idea of what is going on in “ ‘Metacompact’
means metacompact” even though (I assume) you do not know what “metacom-
pact” means—you only need to know what is going on in “ ‘Bachelor’ means un-
married man.” The meaning of the first sentence—if not the exact thing then at
least the ballpark it falls in—is predictable from the meanings of (at least some
of) its components and the way they are arranged. Meaning-talk is also normal
in that it allows many standard inferences. If “metacompact” and “hyperthy-
roidism” both meant metacompact (they don’t, in fact), then they would mean
the same thing.
This screen out idioms. Idioms are notorious for refusing to look compo-
sitional and resisting many of the standard inferences. Jumping the shark has
nothing to do with sharks. Knowing what it is to kick a ball doesn’t guarantee
that you have the right idea about kicking the bucket (rather it strongly sug-
gests a wrong idea). And it does not do, except maybe in some bizarre context,
to ask how many buckets have been kicked this year, or to infer from two play-
wrights’ jumping the shark that they jumped either the same shark or different
ones. (In fairness I should add that meaning-talk too resists some of the infer-
ences allowed by the talk of concrete objects and events. It does not do to ask,
as one might ask of a murder, where “bachelor” meant unmarried man. But any
talk of the non-concrete is bound to be abnormal in some such way. The point

is that, compared to meaning-talk, idioms’ abnormality is on a different order
altogether.)
Definiteness screens out what may be called living metaphors. I should con-
fess that I have no worked-out theory of metaphor at hand, but the following
seems a reasonable, rough-and-ready working definition (more extensively dis-
cussed in Blackburn a): metaphor is a figure of speech that suggests simi-
larity. Thus “Fodor is a Granny’s boy” suggests (to the initiated) some qualities
Fodor and Granny’s boy have in common. A living metaphor—again a rough
approximation—is one that leaves it more or less open what aspects are to be
compared for similarity, or even what is to be compared with what. “Juliet is the
sun” and “God is dead” are of this kind. With the latter we are not even explic-
itly told (until much later, with more metaphors) just what is to be compared
with the death of God. But this openness is wholly absent from paradigmatic
meaning-talk. “ ‘Bank’ has two meanings” is as dry and definite as “Russell
married four times.”
Dead metaphors, on the other hand, do not feel open. These are metaphors
in which similarity in one respect is so salient that it rarely occurs to the audi-
ence to explore others. They don’t even feel like metaphors and are often not
recognised as such. “Hurdles in the path” is dead; we see directly through it, as
it were, and think only of difficulties. “Abyss of despair” is perhaps not quite
as dead. There is still room for choosing the point of comparison: it can be the
depth or darkness of an abyss, or the mentality of the person falling into it. But
it is still dead enough, for whichever comparison one chooses, the metaphor
cashes out much the same: extreme despair. Some metaphors, then, do not fail
the definiteness test.
But all metaphors living and dead fail the unparaphrasability test. Almost
every sentence allows some paraphrase, but sometimes a semantic or syntactic
feature can be paraphrased away, sometimes not quite. It is the paraphrasabil-
ity of the distinctive feature that is the test. For metaphors living and dead alike,
the distinctive feature, what makes metaphors metaphors, is the metaphorical

element—suggested similarity, according to our working definition. And this
can be easily paraphrased away; you just state the similarity explicitly. For a
dead metaphor, there is one single paraphrase that does it full justice. For a
living metaphor, no single definite paraphrase nearly does. But paraphrasable
they still are.
What is distinctive of meaning-talk is its use of semantic concepts, dressed
up as nouns like “meaning,” “ambiguity;” as verbs like “to stand for,” “to clar-
ify;” and as adjectives and adverbs derived therefrom. But these elements are
known for resisting paraphrase. The best one can do with “ ‘Bachelor’ means
unmarried man” is likely not much better than “ ‘Bachelor’ and ‘unmarried
man’ are synonymous,” which leaves the semantic element intact. “ ‘Bachelor’
and ‘unmarried man’ are interchangeable while preserving truth” does no bet-
ter, since truth is a semantic concept. Finally, “ ‘Bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’
are interchangeable in such and such cases,” with all the cases enumerated non-
semantically with brute force (supposing this can be done), won’t do either.
When two things are said to be interchangeable it is implied that something
stays constant through the change. So “bow” and “bough” are interchangeable
if it is the pronunciation that is to stay constant, but not if it is the meaning
or the truth condition of the sentence in which these words occurs. Just say-
ing that two words are interchangeable either leaves the constant unspecified,
in which case the purported paraphrase fails to paraphrase; or tacitly speci-
fies the constant to be meaning or truth conditions, in which case the semantic
element remains.
This dilemma repeats itself for all instances of meaning-talk. (Which is
unsurprising, for otherwise naturalising semantics wouldn’t be such a hard
exercise.) So metaphors, since they fail this final test, are a poor model for
meaning-talk.
 It seems to have become “conventional wisdom” by  that “the intentional/semantic pred-
icates form a closed circle” (Fodor : ).
 Yablo () finds dead metaphors good enough to model math-talk on, which is just as well,
since math-talk does have some distinctive features, such as references to numbers, which

Turning to make-believe, we finally find something promising. There are
contexts in which it is clearly true to say that Crotone is on the arch of the boot
and false to say that it is on the upper, while the speaker is not committed to any
fact about boots in either case. Utterances like these may sound odd or even
patently false when taken out of context, but if the context is right it is the one
who objects “But there is no boot there,” or “Where is the rabbit?”, that is in
the wrong. So make-believe seems to share many of the problematic features
of meaning-talk, but is not quite as problematic itself. This is encouraging. So
perhaps:
Meaning-talk is make-believe talk and can be understood as such,
using ordinary make-believe discourse as a model (the make-believe
model).
This is my Fictionalist Hypothesis. In the remainder of this Chapter I want to
show, if not quite that this hypothesis is true, then at least that it is plausible.
.. Why the Model Is Good
Before we put the make-believe model to the above tests, let me illustrate just
what make-believe is like with a more elaborate example. (I’m not going to
say what make-believe is, since I am interested in make-believe not for its own
sake, but only insofar as it resembles or fails to resemble meaning-talk). The
example:
As a child, lonely yet millitant, I spent many an hour making paper
battleships, dividing them into fleets, lining them up on the floor
and having them fire torpedoes at each other. (To fire a torpedo,
you load a pencil in a stapler, compress the spring and let go.) I
took turns to play on behalf of each fleet, taking delight at sinking
enemy ships.
Now this is a game. But this obvious fact bears emphasis: the sort of make-
believe I want to model meaning-talk on is very much a game, a flight from
seem paraphrasable. But meaning-talk is a quite different story.

reality but with strings attached. A flight from reality because what is true in
make-believe need not be true of anything in reality. Italy is no boot, the rope is
no rabbit or hole or log, and I commanded no fleet. But with strings attached,
because what happens in make-believe of this sort is nevertheless constrained
by what happens in the real world through what Walton () calls the “prin-
ciples of generation.” Principles of generation are rules for generating make-
believed truths from truths in the real world. For example, I can truly say
that
) Torpedo No.  missed HMS Vulcan by just  metres, but hit HMS Phlo-
giston by luck
only if the pencil missed a paper ship narrowly but hit an unintended one in-
stead. This is a principle of generation (or simply G-principle). We can truly
say that the rabbit is going under the log only if we are manipulating the rope
in a corresponding way. We can truly say that Crotone is on the arch of the
boot only if Crotone is roughly where it actually is. These too are G-principles.
We cannot truly say that HMS Phlogiston survived the attack (G-principles say
that stricken ships sink), or that two bulls are fighting for a log if the rope is
not being manipulated in the right way (another violation of G-principles), or
that Salt Lake City is on the arch of the boot (the geography does not satisfy
G-principles). As the world and the G-principles stand, these things are make-
believedly false.
This flight-with-strings-attachedness is a nice property for our model to
have. Meaning-talk too seems otherworldly—neither committed to nor true
of any fact—but at the same time depends for its truth on what’s really going
 Walton has a wider notion of make-believe, according to which the creation and enjoyment
of works of art also involve make-believing. Truths in make-believe of this kind are much
less constrained by reality. But I adopt a narrower notion, since meaning-talk is tightly con-
strained by what is going on in the real world, and the less constraint cases are not relevant
for understanding it. Walton () also distinguishes between content-oriented and prop-
oriented make-believe. In content-oriented make-believe the players are primarily interested
in the truths generated; in prop-oriented make-believe they are primarily interested in the
real world conditions that do the generating. I have not made much of this otherwise illumi-
nating distinction since meaning-talk, if a kind of make-believe, is clearly prop-oriented.

on in the world. What “bachelor” means and whether “bank” is ambiguous de-
pend somehow on how English speakers behave, though exactly how is hard to
articulate.
The following is probably not too far off, although not terribly precise ei-
ther: John’s actual behaviour and his dispositions inferable therefrom generate
the make-believed truth (or falsehood, as the case may be) that by “bachelor” he
means unmarried man; the majority English speakers’ behaviour and dispo-
sitions generate the make-believed truth that “bachelor” means unmarried man
in English; and these together with the behaviour and dispositions of the ma-
jority German speakers generate the make-believed truth that “bachelor” and
“Junggeselle” are synonymous. Other instances of meaning-talk—those about
ambiguity, clarity, meaningfulness and so on—can be reduced to the talk of
synonymy and then, following these same principles, be sanctioned as true or
false.
What needs explaining is not just that we are confident that utterances like
“By ‘bachelor’ John means so and so” are sometimes true, but also that we are
completely unable to say anything illuminating about why we are so confident.
What it is about John that makes us think that he means so and so? Griceans
say that it is John’s intention that endows his words with meaning, and that his
intention is apparent to us. Maybe so, but then we are at a loss to say just what
it is about John that causes us to believe that he has the intention we think he
 These behaviour and dispositions are (roughly) what Kripke () calls the assertability con-
ditions of “By ‘bachelor’ John means unmarried man.” So what Kripke has proposed (not in his
own name) is essentially correct by my light. But then one would probably make better sense
of the idea of assertability if the assertable is just what is sanctioned as true by G-principles.
Despite its inherent vagueness, the idea that we play by G-principles seems to me to unify
many plausible explanatory attempts.
 Roughly, ambiguity is synonymy of one expression with two others which are not always
synonymous between themselves; unclarity of a sentence is its being possibly synonymous
with more than one sentence, of which none is salient enough in the context compared to
the rest; meaningfulness is synonymy with some meaningful expression (maybe some expres-
sions have to be posited as meaningful within meaning-talk, but this is not to say that the
posited meaningfulness cannot be explained outside meaning-talk, say in terms of behaviour
and dispositions). The only semantic notion that I do not think can be reduced to synonymy
relations is vagueness, but that is a headache for everybody anyway. And because vagueness
has something to do not just with language, but with the way the world is, I suspect that it
cuts across what is said here.

has. In short, we don’t know how we know. The epistemology of meaning-talk
is obscure.
If you believe that meaning-talk is just ordinary descriptive talk, you ought
to find the obscurity surprising. Often when we are confident that some de-
scriptive utterance is true, we know why we are: I saw the cat on the mat; Jack
reads the gauge and learns that the tank is empty; Jill reasons inductively that
she will be dead one day. But in the case of meanings and intentions, we do
not directly perceive them, we have no instrument that reliably detects them.
People’s overt behaviour is all we have to work with, but the relation between
behaviour and intention (and hence meaning) is messy. The inference rules we
implicitly use cannot be summarised into anything elegant like the principles
of induction.
(I do not say that taking meaning-talk to be normal descriptive talk creates
some inexplicable mystery. The point is just that if meaning-talk is a species of
normal descriptive talk (I do accept that it is descriptive), then it is epistemically
unlike the rest of normal descriptive talk, and there had better be a story about
that.)
The make-believe model doesn’t exactly explain the obscurity, but it has the
virtue of making the obscurity less surprising. As Walton () points out,
G-principles are often rougher and richer than the players themselves realise.
Consider the principle that a big paper ship in reality is a big—not small—
battleship in make-believe. It goes without saying once I pointed it out to you,
but the chance is that it had also gone completely without your notice before
I pointed it out. Or consider Walton’s example, the game where stumps are
make-believed to be bears. One principle of this game (given the way it is
normally played) says: “seeing a stump through the undergrowth will make it
[true in make-believe] that one sees a bear through the undergrowth” (Walton
: ). Children play in accordance with this principle without so much
as realising that they are playing according to this principle. (Even if they are
aware of this one, surely there are many others of which they aren’t.) Now if

meaning-talk is like make-believe, then it isn’t so surprising that the principles
governing the truth of meaning-talk are also so rich and rough as to defy neat
codification, without at the same time overwhelming or paralysing meaning-
talkers, after all: G-principles are all like this; our inarticulateness is to be
expected.
Of course, this does not really explain how we are able to follow messy
rules without being able to articulate them. This is a problem in its own right,
whether or not the make-believe model of meaning-talk is correct. And it is
business for psychologists. The virtue I claim for the make-believe model is
just that, unlike a descriptive model, it unifies two explananda that do display
striking similarity.
Now we can go back and reexamine the four relevant features of meaning-talk.
How many of them are present in make-believe utterances? Answer: four.
Make-believe utterances do not require special setting-up. They set them-
selves up. Provided the players share the relevant G-principles and are in a
position to conduct any normal conversation at all, make-believe games can be
initiated at will, any time and anywhere. When I hold up a rope and say “Now
the rabbit . . . ,” all normally intelligent interlocutors will be immediately on
board.
Make-believe utterances also behave syntactically like normal descriptive
talk. Indeed, the two are usually completely indistinguishable if you take them
out of the context. (Think of, say, “The rabbit goes under the log.”)
Make-believe utterances do not feel open, or at least need not be. In a con-
crete case the G-principles need not leave us in any doubt about what the real
world has to be like for a particular make-believe utterance to be true. The
answer can be highly salient: the shape of Italy (on the map) and the location
of Crotone, say. (Knowing roughly what kind of situation it takes to gener-
ate a make-believed truth is consistent with not being able to articulate the
G-principles in involved. In some cases it can be as clear as anything that the

shape of Italy on the map generates the truth that it is a boot; in other cases,
not so clear . We are not able to specify just which cases. But we know it when
we are in it.)
Finally, make-believe utterances are decidedly unparaphrasable, for their
distinctive feature lies not in the sentences uttered, but in the context in which
they are uttered (and which they create for themselves). If you merely hear the
sentence “The rabbit goes under the log,” you won’t be able to tell whether it is
said of a real rabbit or of a would-be bowline. You have to know the context. But
while sentences may be paraphrasable, contexts generally are not. (A purported
paraphrase may describe the context, but that is not the same as creating one,
as make-believe utterances do. The difference between describing and creating
contexts should be heartfelt to anyone who ever tried, and miserably failed, to
retell a joke which was actually impossible to retell. Those jokes only worked
in the subtle context in which they were originally told. Once the context is
gone, describing (rather than recreating) it would not place the retold joke in
that context again. Your audience may even fail to see what might have been
funny about it.)
One last point, and it is crucial to the success of the make-believe model:
the real world conditions that render a make-believe utterance true are not the
facts the utterance is true of. With some twist which I will just register here
but make more clear later, this follows from the disquotational property of the
truth predicate: “p” is true just in case p. Thus, while it is the rope’s going
through a loop that renders it make-believedly true that the rabbit comes out
of hole, still the utterance rendered true, “The rabbit comes out of the hole,”
is (make-believedly) true just in case (make-believedly) the rabbit comes out
of the hole. The rope’s actually going through a loop is no part of the truth
conditions.
You will have noticed the “make-believedly” in the parentheses, and you
will have been rightly suspicious of it. I will have more to say about this in
Section ... Suffice it to say at this point that the distance between the truth

of a make-believed utterance and the real world conditions that generate its
truth, if it can be sustained, is a very good thing, and conversely the failure to
sustain it would be very bad. For I have argued that true meaning-talk is not
true of anything real. But the real world conditions responsible for the truth of
true meaning-talk, well, are real. They had better not be what true meaning-
talk is true of.
.. Other Models
Setting the lingering doubt aside for the moment, the virtue of the make-believe
model seems abundant. But how does it compare with the rivals? There are
mainly two of them, instrumentalism and expressivism. I will review both
briefly.
On the instrumentalist view, meaning-talk is an instrument for getting cer-
tain things done. Here is Kripke, apparently attributing such a view to Wittgen-
stein:
When we pronounce that a child has mastered the rule of addition [and so
is able to mean plus by ‘plus’], we mean that we can entrust him to react as
we do in interactions such as that . . . between the grocer and the customer.
Our entire lives depend on countless such interactions, and on the ‘game’
of attributing to others the mastery of certain concepts or rules, thereby
showing that we expect them to behave as we do.
The expectation is not infallibly fulfilled. . . . When the community de-
nies of someone that he is following certain rules, it excludes him from var-
ious transactions such as the one between the grocer and the customer. It
indicates that it cannot rely on his behaviour in such transactions. (Kripke
: )
According to this view, meaning-talk is a tool that screens people for co-
operative potential. If an individual is capable of cooperation, we grant him
membership in our cooperative community. If he is not, we reject him. This
seems right. My only complaint is that it does not explain why meaning-talk
is truth-apt. It is not even clear whether instrumentalism per se is equipped
to explain truth-aptness, since a view about what purpose a discourse is used
serve can leave it fairly undetermined just what kind of discourse, truth-apt or

otherwise, can serve it. There is no obvious reason why the granting and with-
holding of membership must be done with truth-apt utterances. “Hooray!” and
“Boo!” can do just as well, perhaps when supplied with a bit more syntax. So
while instrumentalism may say plausible things about meaning-talk, it doesn’t
commit itself enough to really compete with the fictionalism; fictionalism is a
version of instrumentalism but not vice versa. If instrumentalism tries to com-
pete in explaining truth-aptness, then it fares worse than fictionalism by not
explaining it.
On the expressivist view, and this seems to be another way to read Kripke,
meaning-talk is not even descriptive, but is expressive of attitudes. Thus “when
we play this game [of attributing mastery of language to others] we depict no
special ‘state’ of their minds” (Kripke : ). All we do is honour other peo-
ple as our peer or reject them as wired or alien. Meaning-talk is really hooray-
boo in disguise.
Expressivism faces two problems that fictionalism is free from. First, ex-
pressivism flies in meaning-talk’s descriptive face. Second, an expressivist se-
mantics that respects classic logic is hard to pull off, as the long-standing Frege-
Geach problem has shown. These two problems—a great liability even if they
can be paid off in the end—seem enough to drive any view out of competition if
it has no large asset to compensate. And indeed, it seems, expressivism doesn’t
have any. Fictionalism fares at least as well as expressivism in all respects: in
explaining how meaning-talk is truth-apt, how its truth depends on real world
conditions, and so on. On the downside, the fictionalist claims that meaning-
talk is make-believe; if make-believe is understood as some sort of pretence,
this seems psychologically implausible (but make-believe doesn’t have to be
understood this way: see section ..). But the expressivist claim that we are
really venting attitudes when we think we are tracking the world is hardly more
plausible. On the whole, fictionalism looks like a much better bet.
 In fairness to Kripke, he never suggests that the instrumentalism can explain truth-aptness.
 Some say quasi-realism is a subspecies of fictionalism (Lewis ), some say it is an entirely

.. Objections and Replies
Objection . You speak of “truth in make-believe” and “make-believedly true,”
but isn’t there one and only one notion of truth, true-period?
Reply. Yes, truth is univocal. And I do believe that meaning-talk is true or false
simpliciter, just as “Snow is white” is true or false simpliciter. Not all truths are
equal in their context or commitment, however. Meaning-talk carries less com-
mitment than meets the eye because of its context (for want of a better term), the
context of make-believe. Locutions like “truth in make-believe” and “make-
believedly true” are meant to mark the context, not to suggest an alternative
notion of truth.
Objection . According to your model, there are facts in the real world that
generate truths in meaning-talk. But you insist that meaning-talk is not true of
them. How can this be? If John’s behaviour generates the truth that by “bache-
lor” he means unmarried man, why is the utterance “By ‘bachelor’ John means
unmarried man” not true of John’s behaviour? Isn’t it a semantic fact in front of
our eyes? If generating the truth of an utterance entails making the utterance true,
your model is inconsistent with your anti-realism which motivates the model
in the first place.
Reply. But generating truth does not entail making-true or being true of—not
when the truth is generated through something like a G-principle. Consider
again the “The rabbit goes under the log,” said of the would-be bowline. Some
facts about the rope generate the truth of the utterance. But the same facts, at
a different context, may fail to generate the truth of the utterance of exactly the
same sentence. For an almost trivial example, just introduce another animal.
different animal, more like classical expressivism (Blackburn ). I side with Blackburn
on what to make of his own idea (though this is not the place to go into details). However, as
Blackburn himself concedes, the quasi-realist too has to solve the Frege-Geach problem and is
not much better placed than the classical expressivist to do so. This seems reason enough for




) The armadillo comes out of the hole . . . and now the rabbit goes under
the log, and the armadillo goes back into the hole again.
Facts about the rope are exactly as before, but my utterance “the rabbit goes
under the log” now rings false, since it should have been an armadillo. This is
of course what you should expect from G-principles. With the first occurrence
of “armadillo” I introduced the G-principle that one end of the rope is (make-
believedly) an armadillo; then it becomes false that that end of the rope is a
rabbit.
So do the facts about the rope make it true that a rabbit is going under a
log? Perhaps; but if they do, they (exactly the same facts) might just as well
have made it false that a rabbit is going under a log, had a different G-principle
been introduced. One can of course stipulate a notion of making-true so that
the same fact could make utterances of the same sentence in roughly the same
situation either true or false, depending on what else the speaker has done. But
this is not our ordinary, realism-implicating notion of making-true, which gives
no such role to the speaker. Whatever I do, whatever G-principle I introduce, if
the cat is on the mat, that fact could not make my utterance “The cat is on the
mat” false.
It may be said that the facts about the rope plus the G-principles that are
in force make the utterance “The rabbit goes under the log” true. Similarly
it may be said that the facts about John’s behaviour plus the G-principles we
use for meaning-talk makes it true that by “bachelor” John means unmarried
man. It may even be said that “By ‘bachelor’ John means unmarried man,”
if true, is true of the conjunction of John’s behaviour and the incumbent G-
principles. Since there is a fact about what G-principles are incumbent—they
are all realized in our brains, after all—doesn’t this mean there are facts about
what John means, after all?
I concede that, in this very attenuated sense, there are semantic facts. But
this is not a grave concession. To say that there are semantic facts in this sense

is hardly more than saying that if you hold the entire world (including all of
us meaning-talkers) fixed, you will have fixed what we think (given our G-
principles) Jones means by “bachelor.” There isn’t much of a realist spirit in
this, really. For one thing, a realist typically claims something much stronger:
that not only are there facts about what John means, but these facts are also
intrinsic to John (or mostly so). These are facts about John, not facts about us or
our G-principles.
The concession is also consistent with the following claim which I endorse
as true, and which sounds anything but realist. If some being could survey our
world in its entirety and apply its own G-principles, then even the facts about
the entire world would not fix what John means for that being. Indeed many
of those facts—including facts about what G-principles we use in meaning-
talk—would be simply irrelevant; that being would just look at John’s behaviour
and so on and apply his own G-principles. (I guess this is what Wittgenstein
had in mind when he said (: ) that even God, were He to look into my
head, would not know what I’m talking about. Presumably God doesn’t have
G-principles.)
Objection . Can you square the idea of make-believed truth with the T-schema:
“p” is true iff p? Consider how the schema would apply to your favourite ex-
ample:
) “The rabbit goes under the log” is true iff the rabbit goes under the log.
This is certainly wrong. “The rabbit goes under the log” is true in make-believe
only if (as you say) the rope is being manipulated in a suitable way. A real
rabbit’s going under a real log, as the right-hand side of () has it, is neither
here nor there. If the T-schema does not give the right truth conditions for
make-believe utterances, this is bad news for the idea of make-believed truth
(not for T-schema, which we all know and love). So maybe we shouldn’t think of
make-believe utterances as truth-apt at all, although we call them true or false
in a loose manner of speaking. If so, then either meaning-talk is (as you believe)

genuinely truth-apt and you cannot model it on make-believe, or meaning-talk
is not truth-apt, and you should re-model it, perhaps with expressivism, after
all.
Reply. The problem with () is only notational. Fix the notation and it would
come out right. Something that approximates a fix is suggested by Lewis (),
which is to treat both sides as implicitly prefixed with an operator. For example:
) “Sherlock Holmes is a brilliant detective” is true iff Sherlock Holmes is a
brilliant detective.
which seems incorrect, can be treated as as an ecliptic version of something that
is correct:
) “In the stories of Holmes, Sherlock Holmes is a brilliant detective” is true
iff in the stories of Holmes, Sherlock Holmes is a brilliant detective.
The trick, as you can see, is to build an in-fiction operator into both sides of
“iff.” Notice that the operator on the left has to go inside the quotation marks,
so the T-schema knows to apply itself, and can apply itself to yield a correct
result.
But the Lewisian fix using operators does not quite work for make-believe
utterances. In fact it does not quite work for (), either. The clean sentence
“Holmes is a brilliant detective,” without any operator implicit or explicit, can
be used to tell a story. Whereas a prefixed sentence, “In the story of Holmes,
Holmes is a brilliant story,” can only be used for reporting a story, not for telling
it. (At most it can be used in a (probably non-Holmes) story to report a Holmes
story.) If we were to try to fix () with something like an in-make-believe
operator, things would seem even worse. Not only does the sentence without
an operator differ markedly from the sentence with one (“Want to know where
Crotone is? Look, in my make-believe it is on the arch of the Italian boot.”);
 This isn’t exactly what Lewis did. His aim is different—to give non-vacuous truth conditions,
rather than the vacuous ones given by the T-schema—so he does not prefix the operator to the
right-hand side. And his subject, fiction-talk, is of course a different story from make-believe.

but it just isn’t very plausible to suppose that whenever we say “By ‘bachelor’
John means unmarried man” we are secretly prefixing our statements with any
operator.
While operators won’t do, an implicit index, indexing the utterance to a
make-believe context, seems promising. To actually work out the semantics is
beyond my ability at this stage, but the basic idea is simple: () should be
parsed as
) “[The rabbit goes under the log]m” is true iff [the rabbit goes under the
log]m.
The in-make-believe index, [. . . ]m, takes whatever is in the brackets to such
exotic worlds as populated by paper battleships, rope-made rabbits and logs,
and boots and hexagons that are countries. We are not ontologically committed
to those worlds or to their residents, but we are somehwo able to evaluate make-
believe utterances in those worlds and reach enough agreement for the practice
to go on.
This, I said, is a promising solution, if not a worked-out one. In particu-
lar there should be no special worry about the indexing mechanism. [. . . ]m is
in good company with the likes of “today” and “here.” What “yesterday” (or
[. . . ]yd, to make the appearance similar too) does, for example, is take the ut-
terance inside the brackets to the actual world when the date is one day before
the date it is at the time of the utterance, and the utterance is evaluated there.
(Thus “It rained yesterday” becomes “[It rains]yd,” and if it is uttered on May ,
, it is evaluated at the actual world on May , .) [. . . ]m does roughly the
same thing, although there is the difference that while “yesterday” will proba-
bly be mentioned explicitly (more so than “today” and “here”), [. . . ]m is almost
always implicit.
Objection . Asserting “By ‘bachelor’ John means unmarried man” is solemn
business. We do not just make-believe that he does; we seriously believe that he
does. If you insist that we are nonetheless only make-believing or pretending,

you are making the incredibly strong claim that our being in a make-believe
state can be in principle inaccessible to introspection (Stanley ).
Reply. This objection applies only if make-believe is understood as a mental
state. Now many people do understand it this way (principally, Walton ),
but I do not. On the account I defend, make-believe is only a placeholder. It
is whatever linguistic activity that (a) generates truths, (b) is less than fully
committing, but (c) is still constrained by real world conditions according to
certain rich and rough rules. I claimed that we do engage in such activities,
as the exmaples in () and () show, and I hypothesised that meaning-talk is
one such.
Whether making-believing in my sense also involves a distinct mental state I
do not know. I rather doubt it. But in any event make-believe understood in the
placeholder sense, holding the place I just described, is compatible with belief.
If you ask me whether I believe that Crotone is on the arch of the Italian boot,
in the right context my answer would surely be yes, with as much sincerity and
seriousness as I am capable. In that context—the context of make-believe—to
answer no would not usually shift the context, unless one follows up with some
other speech act. Without a shift, the answer no would simply amount to a
falsehood.
Objection . You say that it is only in make-believe that “bachelor” means un-
married man, so you must say that it is only in make-believe that “It is only
in make-believe that ‘bachelor’ means unmarried man” means that it is only in
make-believe that “bachelor” means unmarried man; and then you must say
that it is only in make-believe that that means what it does. You see where it
leads? Well, perhaps I can put it this way. A make-believe utterance, just to be
what it is, must be meaningful. But then how can all utterances’ being mean-
ingful depend on make-believe? Can make-believe lift itself up by pulling its
own hair?

Reply. This objection is not clearly stated. If one states it clearly, as I am going
to do, the error is obvious. The objection assumes that meaningful utterances
are meaningful only because we say so. Then it weds this assumption to my
theory, according to which to say that an utterance is meaningful is to make-
believe that it is meaningful, and claims that we now end up in a circle (or
maybe a regress): utterances are meaningful only because we make-believedly
say so, but to make-believedly say anything at all is to say something meaning-
ful.
A circle indeed, but the fault is with the assumption, not with my theory.
Why should we believe that meaningful utterances are meaningful only be-
cause we say they are? This is unbelievable, and it is no part of my theory. The
make-believe model says quite the opposite: meaningful utterances are mean-
ingful because things are thus and so in the world. Given things are thus and so
in the world with John (say), our G-principles generate the truth that what John
just said is meaningful (and that it means that Smith is a miserable unmarried
man).
Objection . One last worry. On your account, meaning-talk just doesn’t seem
sufficiently objective, since the relevant facts in the world (about John’s be-
haviour, say) do not determine what G-principles should apply to them.
Consider the analogy. Nothing about the shape of Italy dictates that our
G-principle should generate the truth that it is a left-foot boot rather than a
right-foot one. It can be either way; it is an arbitrary matter. Now on your ac-
count, the same set of facts in the would that generate the truth that “bachelor”
means unmarried man might just as well generate the truth that “bachelor”
means (say) cricket, had the relevant G-principles been different. While the
lack of objectivity in the boot case is fine (no one thinks that Italy is objectively
a right- or left-foot boot), it is worrisome in the case of meaning-talk. Is it just
 I have left the objection in its muddy formulation, not because it is fun not to be clear when
I can, but because (I think) the muddy thought expressed in the muddy formulation is likely
to occur to the reader before he has time to think it through. (It occurred to me.)

as arbitrary that “bachelor” means unmarried man rather than cricket, as is
Italy’s being a right- rather than left-foot boot? An affirmative answer sounds
implausible.
Reply. Let’s distinguish ontological from epistemic objectivity. A discourse is
ontologically objective iff truth in the discourse is mind-independent; a dis-
course is epistemically objective iff participants with the same evidence ought
to agree in their judgements (Searle ). Epistemic objectivity does not re-
quire ontological objectivity. Thus one can consistently hold that moral talk is
epistemically objective—equally well-informed people should agree that, say,
murder is wrong—while denying that murder would be wrong had no one
thought so.
I agree that meaning-talk is objective in the epistemic sense. But the se-
mantic fictionalist need not deny this. Perhaps the fact—a real fact—is that we
share similar G-principles (similar in behavioural or dispositional terms). If so,
then given the same facts about John we ought to agree on what he means by
“bachelor.”
But I deny that meaning-talk is ontologically objective (this directly follows
from semantic anti-realism). And why not? There seems to be no evidence to
the contrary, except maybe a faith in the reality of meaning and representation,
which I suspect is the driving motive behind the naturalising program. (Not
that this program has not produced insights, but its non-success is also ample
evidence that meaning-talk is not objective.) And no unpalatable consequence
will follow if meaning-talk is not ontologically objective. We can still argue
seriously over what Linear B scripts meant; we can still sue people for defama-
tion. So long as meaning-talk is epistemically objective, life will go on much as
usual.
One consequence of denying ontological objectivity to meaning-talk may
sound a little strange. Thus imagine a world—not actual—in which people
behave and are disposed to behave exactly like us, except they have different

G-principles. And when we think that by “plus” John means plus, they think
their John (an exact physical replica of our John) means quus. Are they wrong?
Are we wrong? The slightly strange consequence is that both the plus-people
(us) and the quus-people (them) may be right from their own perspective, and
each is right to think the other side wrong. Applying our G-principles to the
quus-world, which is just like ours in all relevant respects, we conclude that
their John means by “plus” plus, and that those quus-people are mistaken to
think their John means quus. And we are right given our own G-principles.
But when those quus-people apply their G-principle to our world they reach
the diametrically opposed conclusion, and they are right too in light of their
G-principles.
A little strange perhaps, but that’s all that can be said against it. This conse-
quence is intelligible, coherent, not paradoxical. The world according to moral
relativists is strange in a structurally identical way: people following conflict-
ing moral codes may each be right in thinking the other side wrong. And moral




There are no semantic facts, we are not committed to them, and meaning-talk
should be understood as make-believe. If all this is right, the naturalising
project is misguided. There are no facts about what a brain is thinking, or (if
thinking requires something thought) whether it thinks at all. There is nothing
to naturalise.
To be sure, the brain appears to us to be thinking and representing. But, as
the history (or prehistory) of science teaches us, the appearance often can be
accounted for without supposing it is the truth. Perhaps we are just evolved
to see ourselves and others as thinking and representing (“see” is not factive
here). If tying a bowline had been of supreme importance to our survival and
the rabbit story had been the only way to learn to do it, I conjecture that when
tying bowlines it would be just as hard for us not to see rabbits going under
logs.
“The condition of life might include error,” says Nietzsche (, §). Has
he been vindicated (as seems often the case)? Not quite this time. Some make-
believe may indeed be essential to life as we know it, and meaning-talk may
well be part thereof. But make-believe in itself is no error. It is even truth-
generating.
That said, not all truths are equal in their commitment. To assume more
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